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Abstract 
In this paper, we seek to understand how a multi-product multi-market firm (for example, a 
multinational firm) designs its organizational structure and compensation scheme when its profitability 
is conditioned by how market information flows within the company. By modifying its organizational 
structure–centralizing or decentralizing decision making–and changing the weights of its compensation 
scheme, the firm can shape how information flows and is represented, changing the firm’s profitability. 
We find that, when being multi-product (having to allocate a scarce resource between markets), the 
headquarters links the organizational design of decision rights between different product markets. The 
headquarters decentralizes decision rights in products with higher returns to product differentiation 
while it centralizes decision rights in products with lower returns to product differentiation. As 
centralization is complementary with product standardization and decentralization is complementary 
with product differentiation, the organizational design conditions the firm’s market policy. The relation 
among product’s decision rights remains even when the headquarters cannot control how local 
managers allocate resources in their own local divisions. Our results are robust to different 
generalizations. Our paper therefore, contributes to the literature on organizational design by analyzing 
the case of multi-product multi-market firms. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we seek to understand how a multi-product multi-market firm (for example, a multina-
tional firm) designs its organizational structure and compensation scheme when its profitability is condi-
tioned by how market information flows within the company. By modifying its organizational structure–
centralizing or decentralizing decision making–and changing the weights of its compensation scheme,
the firm can shape how information flows and is used, changing the firm’s profitability. Our paper con-
tributes to the literature on organizational design by analyzing the case of multi-product multi-market
firms highlighting a relation on how decision rights are allocated within a firm.
In the model, a monopolist manufactures two different products to sell in two (country) markets. The
products have independent demands (they are, for example, coffee and candy bars) and can be customized
to meet the country demand’s specificities. In each country, the firm has a manager who oversees demand
information and who may have product-design decision rights if decision making has been decentralized.
The two country managers are under the umbrella of a headquarters’ office (hereafter, HQ) that has
the same objective function as the firm. Country demands are heterogeneous (for example, they have
different demand elasticities) and thus country-level profits are maximized when the product’s charac-
teristics are tailored to the specificities of the country’s demand. The country manager, however, only
imperfectly observes his own country’s demand heterogeneity, but can improve the quality of his signal
by devoting more time and effort to information acquisition.
Managerial time, however, is a scarce resource that must be split between the two product markets
the manager oversees. Time and effort are complementary. Effort determines the quality of the signal,
while time lowers the cost of exerting it—that is, exerting the same amount of effort over a longer period
of time is less costly to the manager. Nonetheless, the decisions in the two markets are not independent:
as time is a limited resource, the additional time devoted to one market is not devoted to the other and
this results in an increase in the latter market’s cost of effort.
The firm must decide whether, and how much, to customize the products to the countries it sells to,
adding hazelnut flavoring to its coffee or mixing crunchy rice puffs in its chocolate bars. This decision
can be delegated to the country’s manager, resulting in a decentralized structure, or be centralized in the
HQ’s office. Country managers are self-interested and their pays are endogenous to the firm. If their pay
is simply a share of the firm’s aggregate profits, we say their interests are aligned, while, instead, if they
are an unequal average of the two countries’ profits, we say their incentives are misaligned.
After observing their private signals, each manager acts upon his information. With centralized
decision-making, the managers simultaneously send reports to the HQ’s office. It is this office that,
after receiving the two reports, decides the specificities of the products to manufacture. Instead, with
decentralized decision-making, reports are exchanged between country managers, who then unilaterally
determine the characteristics of their two products.
Obviously, when sending reports, the manager may be strategic, aiming to bias the characteristics of
the products chosen by either the HQ or the other country’s manager. Managers may misreport their ob-
served signals to strategically bias product decisions. If the chosen products are identical across country
markets, there are economies of scale in production and thus, cost savings. If, instead, the products are
heterogeneous, the firm raises revenues as it is implementing third-degree price discrimination. There-
fore, when misreporting, the manager seeks to have the two countries sell the same product, yet he wants
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this product be the ideal product in his own country. From the firm’s point of view, having the manager
misreport information is costly since it lowers the accuracy of the information transmitted, upon which
other agents (HQ or other country) make product decisions. To align the manager’s incentives, the firm
can modify the manager’s compensation, making it more or less aligned with the firm’s profit, and/or
decentralize decision-making.
To understand the workings of the model and gauge intuition for the results obtained in the described
environment, it is useful to start with the existing literature. As our model builds upon this literature, it
inherits some of its workings. Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008)1 analyze the problem of a multi-
market (two countries) single-product firm when the manager of each country perfectly, but privately
observes information about true demand characteristics. As in our paper, there are economies of scale in
homogenizing products and there are also gains from price discrimination when customizing the products
to the respective country markets. Different from our model, however, are that information is exogenous
and does not arise from exerting effort or allocating a scarce resource and that the compensation scheme
is exogenously given.
Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) show that, for compensation schemes that align incentives,
the firm prefers to decentralize decisions, while for those that misalign them, the firm prefers to centralize
them. To see this, consider the case of perfect alignment (country managers and HQ have the same
objective function). Since there is perfect alignment, the maximization problems of all agents are the
same and thus, regardless of who decides, the same decisions are made. As the misalignment increases,
the weight on the manager’s own country profit does too, the manager, then, starts having incentives to
misrepresent information. In his report, the manager seeks to implement product characteristics that are
close to his ideal product, as this makes his country’s division profit grow. If the misalignment is small,
the policy the country manager chooses with decentralization is similar to the one the HQ would choose,
albeit the manager makes his choice with better information, and reduces the mismatch with the country’s
true ideal product. The manager bases his choice on his own observed information and the report that the
other sends. Since the two managers have similar objective functions (the misalignment is small), there
is little incentive to lie about the reports to each other and thus there is only a small bias in their choices.
As the misalignment of incentives increases, however, decisions’ biases increase under decentralization
as objective functions now differ. Moreover communication under decentralization becomes too poor
as they seek to effectively bias the other country’s product implementation. As a result, the HQ prefers
to centralize decisions and pursue lower production costs through product standardization. Although
the managers also misreport information in their communication with the HQ the bias is smaller than it
would be if the information were sent to the other manager. The HQ’s objective function, being the sum
of the two country profits, is closer to the country’s objective function than the objective function of the
other country and thus there are fewer incentives to lie.
Rantakari (forthcoming) can be viewed as adding a new trade-off to this single-product two-country
environment. Now the manager does not perfectly observe the country’s characteristics, instead, like in
our paper, he obtains a signal that can be made more precise by exerting costly effort. As in Alonso,
Dessein, and Matouschek (2008), if the objective functions are aligned, the manager has no incentive
to lie when reporting the market’s characteristic. However, because the cost of effort is only incurred
1See Rantakari (2008) for the case of asymmetric organizational design in the environment of two country single-product
firm with private (perfectly observed) information.
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by the manager and thus in his aligned objective function it carries more weight than the country’s
profit, he exerts less effort than optimal for the firm. With less effort, the manager obtains lower quality
information, by choosing a product that does not coincide with the country’s ideal which lowers profits.
To give incentives to the manager to exert more effort and obtain higher quality information, the firm
must compensate him by misaligning the objective function, but then the manager has incentives to
misreport the signal, which, in turn, lowers profits. When the misalignment needed to induce effort is
too large, the communication between countries is too imperfect, as their diverging objective functions
lead them to strongly bias the reports, and this makes the firm prefer centralized decision-making.
In our paper, we extend this environment to make the firm multi-product and multi-market. Being
multi-product may have multiple effects in the problem of the firm, here we focus on one: the country
manager allocates a scarce resource—managerial time—to acquire information in the two markets he
oversees. The product markets have independent demand yet differ in their returns to product differenti-
ation, which makes the quality of information more valuable in one market than in the other.
Being multi-product and endogenously determining the allocation of the scarce resource qualitatively
modify the findings. If time allocation between product markets were, instead, exogenous, the problem
of the firm would be equivalent to the problem of two multi-market single-product firms and thus the
results in Rantakari (forthcoming) would apply separately to each market. But, if the allocation of time
is endogenous to the manager, as it is in our paper, the results are no longer an immediate generalization
of Rantakari (forthcoming). The asymmetry of the returns to differentiation makes the firm want to shift
resources (time and effort) to the market with higher returns to differentiation. To provide incentives for
such a shift, the firm misaligns incentives, decentralizing decision-making in the high-return market, and
aligning incentives and centralizing decision marking in the market with lower returns to differentiation.
That is, to induce the correct shift of resources, the firm jointly modifies the return to effort and time in
the two markets.
Nonetheless, this negatively correlated allocation of decision rights may not be optimal as it misses
out on one effect in the market with lower return. If the difference in return between the two markets
exists but is small, the cost of shifting resources away from the market with low return and of obtaining
bad quality information in this market, is large. Low quality information means that product decisions
with centralization are “incorrect” and yield low profitability although initially this market was almost as
profitable as the other. To offset this effect, the firm modifies its decision to also decentralize the market
with lower returns to differentiation so that more resources are devoted to it. That is, if the differences in
returns to differentiation between markets are small, the firm prefers to decentralize the two markets. If,
instead, the differences are large, the market with higher returns to differentiation is decentralized while
the other is not.
It is worth noting that whether the firm prefers to decentralize the two markets depends critically on
the manager’s allocation of time not being verifiable. If the HQ was to monitor the allocation of time,
the firm would not need to decentralize the market with lower returns to provide incentives. Instead, the
firm could simply force the manager to devote more time to it. Then, with more time being devoted, the
manager would obtain, and transmit, better information and this would, in turn, raise the profitability of
product standardization and increase the returns from centralizing the market with lower returns.
Lastly, there are other strains of literature that our work relates to. Athey and Roberts (2001), Friebel
and Raith (2010), and Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (forthcoming) explore other environments but
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share with Rantakari (forthcoming) and our paper the trade-off between the choice of effort and the
quality of decision making. Our paper also relates to the organizational design literature that uses a
mechanism design approach, which is summarized in Mookherjee (2006). This literature analyzes the
trade-offs between performance and incentives (not the allocation of decision rights) by assuming that
contracts are complete, which implies that the revelation principle applies. In our framework, and in the
one of Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (forthcoming), imposing completeness
of contracts would imply that decision rights are always centralized, making the framework unsuitable to
understand the problem of organizational design: contract incompleteness (i.e., pays that are contingent
on realized profits) and decision-making allocation are inherent to the same problem.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and solve it in Section
3. In Section 4 we extend the model to consider endogenous coordination needs and externalities in
information acquisition, showing that our results are robust. In Section 5, we conclude.
2 Setup of the Model
A multi-division firm produces two products, A and B, which it sells in two different regional markets,
1 and 2. Each regional division is controlled by a local division manager who is in charge of obtaining
information about demands’ characteristics. We denote by θ ji the demand characteristic of product
j in region i, for j ∈ {A,B} and i ∈ {1,2}.2 Product demands are unrelated both by region and by
product, which implies that demands’ characteristics are independently distributed. We assume that θ ji
is uniformly distributed over the interval [−θ j,θ j], where θA and θB are bounded and, without loss of
generality, θA ≥ θB.
We define a1A as the type of product A the firm offers in region 1, where a1A ∈ R. We define a firm’s
product strategy for market A as a pair of actions (a1A,a2A).3 For instance, given a strategy for product
A, (a1A,a2A), and a taste for product A in region 1, θ1A, profits derived from product A in region 1 are,
Π1A = K− (a1A−θ1A)2−β (a1A−a2A)2.
The term K captures the maximum potential profits that the firm can obtain from product A.4 The
potential profits K and the actual profits Π1A can differ for two reasons: 1) the firm does not achieve a
good fit between product strategy and local demand characteristics in region 1, represented by the term
(a1A−θ1A)2; 2) the firm’s strategy does not accomplish a good coordination in product A across regions,
represented by (a1A− a2A)2. The more standard the product strategy, the lower the term (a1A− a2A)2,
and the better the coordination across regions. Similarly, we define the profit for each regional division
in each product as Π1B, Π2A and Π2B.
2The parameter θ represents demand characteristics that can be used by the firm to increase its profits. For example,
suppose a market with horizontal product differentiation and installed capacity, where preferences are single-peaked at θ , such
that firm’s profits increase as its product is closer to the bliss point θ .
3In this paper we use the concept of strategy to represent two different ideas. ”Firm’s strategy” is intended to represent the set
of decisions that the firm as a whole takes and the objectives it pursues. ”Players’ strategies”, in the sense of the game-theoretic
literature, will refer to the mappings from histories into actions that every agent is entitled to choose.
4In an extension in Section 4.1, the term K is assumed to be an increasing function of the level of divisional integration. The
level of integration represents the losses for not having a good coordination between product strategies. Some papers require
that this level of divisional integration is a firm’s choice variable and some papers do not. See Section 4 for a discussion.
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The payoff of each local manager depends on the compensation scheme designed by the headquarters.
For each product j, we denote by s j the share of the division 2’s profit in market of product j that is
awarded to division 1 and (1− s j) the share of division 1’s profits in market of product j that remains
in division 1. The value of s j (∈ [0,0.5]) defines how much aligned the incentives of local managers are
in terms of product j. For example, in one extreme case when s j = 0, a local manager only cares about
his own profits in market of product j; in the other extreme case when s j = 0.5, a local manager cares
equally about his own profits and the other manager’s profits in market of product j, i.e., the manager
receives half of the total firm’s profits. The payoff of the local manager of division 1 in market j is
U j1 = (1− s j)Π j1+ s jΠ j2−C(e, t), j ∈ {A,B},
where C(e, t) is the cost of acquiring information of precision e when the manager allocates the amount
t of resources, e.g., managerial time.
The headquarters chooses the organizational design of the firm, which is defined as an allocation of
the decision rights, g, and as a compensation scheme, s for each product market, to maximize the ex-
pected sum of division payoffs. Decision rights can be centralized by the headquarters or decentralized
to the local managers, g ∈ {C;D}, where C stands for centralization and D for decentralization. Un-
der centralization of decision rights, each manager sends reports about demands’ characteristics to the
headquarters before it makes a decision of the product strategy. Under decentralization, local managers
may communicate between themselves before taking a decision about the product to be sold in their own
regions. This means that under decentralization the firm’s product strategy results from the addition of
two separate decisions.5
The problem of the headquarters choosing the optimal organization design would be simple if there
were no agency problems. But, as communication is soft and non-verifiable, local managers act strate-
gically to exaggerate their local information in their own interest. Following the literature starting from
Alonso et al (2008), we model informal communication as a one-round cheap talk model (Crawford and
Sobel, 1982).6
Moreover, information about demand characteristics is not perfectly observed by local managers.
Instead, local managers observe an imperfect signal of demand characteristics with the following tech-
nology: the realization of the signal θˆ equals the true value θ with probability
√
e and equals a random
draw from the distribution of θ with probability 1−√e. The quality of this signal reflects the effort
and resources local managers apply to learning about demand characteristics, and it is observable but
non-verifiable to the organizational participants.
The cost of acquiring a signal of quality
√
e exerting a level e of effort and allocating t resources is
C(e, t)≡ µ(t)C(e)σ2. Each local division has a budget of 1 of resources, i.e., 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and tA + tB ≤ 1
5Our framework is symmetric and we follow the literature to concentrate on symmetric structures for each market j ( j ∈
{A,B}) which implies centralizing or decentralizing decision making. Defining s ji the share of product j in region i the
symmetric structure implies s j1 = s j2 = s j. Similarly if g ji is the allocation of decision right of product j in region i the
symmetric structure implies g j1 = g j2 = g j . For these results in asymmetric structures see Alonso et al (2008) and Rantakari
(2008).
6Also see Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) for a reflection over information transmission within organizations: “we assume
that only the surface content of a message like “produce 100 widgets” can be grasped costlessly; the subtler content, which
depends on drawing an inference from the message using knowledge of the sender’s decision rule, can be inferred only at a
cost.”
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per local division, and effort is a free choice in e ∈ [0,1]. We assume C(e) > 0, C′(e) > 0, C′′(e) > 0,
µ(t)> 0, µ ′(t)< 0, µ ′′(t)< 0, and limt→0 µ(t) =+∞. We normalize the cost function to be proportional
to product demand variability, σ2, i.e., it is more difficult to find the information when it is disperse in a
bigger interval. The function C(e) provides the convexity of the cost of effort in learning about market
characteristics. The function µ(t) scales the marginal cost of that effort. Exerting effort and allocating
resources in collecting information in one market are complementary. The effort determines the precision
of the signal, while resources assigned reduce the cost of this effort. For example, it is less costly for
a manager to acquire an amount of information if this is exerted over a longer period of time.7 We
assume that C(e) =−(e+ log(1− e)) and µ(t) = µ (0.5t )b with µ ∈ R+ and b ∈ [0,1].8 We analyze two
different cases concerning the allocation of resources. In our benchmark case, the headquarters controls
how resources are allocated. In the second case, local managers are in charge of resource allocation.9
Finally, the timing of the model for the benchmark case where the headquarters controls resource
allocation is as follows (Figure 1): first, the headquarters chooses the firm’s structure (decision making
and compensation scheme) for each product and an allocation of resources in each division; second,
local managers simultaneously and independently choose how much effort, e, to devote to collect local
information about each product taste; third, signals θˆi j with precisions ei j about the true values of θi j
are observed; fourth, strategic communication takes place; fifth, products ai j are chosen and, finally,
payoffs are delivered. Figure 2.a shows a mix organizational design where the firm decentralizes the
decision right of product A and centralizes the decision rights of product B. Manager 1 chooses a1A and
manager 2 chooses a2A after they communicate with each other. The headquarters chooses a1B and a2B
after communicating with country managers. Figure 2.b shows an organizational design where the firm
decentralizes the decision rights of both products.
For the case where managers can decide resource allocation (Figure 1), the timing changes in that
resource allocation is made by local managers simultaneously with their choice of effort.
Organizational design: decision
making and compensation scheme
Managers
choose efforts
Private information
is delivered
Actions are 
chosen
Communication
takes place
Market characteristics
realize but not observed
Resources are
Allocated
Figure 1: Timing.
7Resources and effort in one activity are complementary. Then, the efforts exerted to collect information about different
products are substitutes. If managers allocate resources, our model can be interpreted as the multi-tasking model of Holmstron
and Milgrom (1991) for substitute effort in the organizational design environment.
8These expressions capture all the general properties and contribute with simplicity in solving the model.
9We motivate the analysis of these two cases as follows: the headquarters may have calculated and allocated which is the
optimal amount of resources in each local division for operational functioning (motivating our benchmark case). However, it
could be argued that within each division, local managers administer how to distribute these resources for learning about market
characteristics (motivating our second case). See Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991): “To take advantage of the information
processing potential of a group of managers, it is necessary to have the managers attend to different things. But these differences
are themselves the major cause of failure of coordination among the several managers.” In their model, “a chief executive
allocates production targets, capital and other resources to division managers who in turn reallocate the budgeted items to
their subordinates, etc. until the resources and targets reach the shops where production takes place.” Nevertheless, delegating
resource allocation may be based upon positive externalities in market learning. We adapt our model to this case in an extension.
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(a) Mixed centralization and decentralization (b) Decentralization in both products’ markets
Figure 2: Organizational Structure depending on decision making.
We focus on Pareto Efficient and Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. We derive the equilibria that max-
imize total expected profits by backward induction. Given the signals and the communication outcome,
we find the best response functions. Then, anticipating these best response functions, local managers en-
gage in optimal strategic communication. Anticipating the optimal strategic communication and actions,
each local manager allocates resources and exerts effort to collect accurate local information. Finally,
given optimal behavior, the headquarters chooses the optimal organizational design of the firm.
3 Equilibrium
To find the optimal structure we calculate the incentive scheme that maximizes total expected profits of
the organization for the four possible allocation of decision rights, taking as given the best response of
local managers in collecting, transmitting, and using information. Then, we compare which structure
provides higher expected profits.
First we analyze how information is transmitted and used (Section 3.1). Second, we study how local
managers acquire local information (Section 3.2). Third, we describe the resource allocation problem
(Section 3.3). Finally, we characterize the organization structure that maximizes total profits (Section
3.4).
We focus on one product in sections 3.1 and 3.2, omitting product subindex j until section 3.3. We
can omit the subindex because product A and B have unrelated demands and profit functions. They are
related only because they share a common input, i.e., resource allocation.
With respect to the equilibrium concept, we focus on Pareto Efficient and Perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. In some stages, there are multiple equilibria that can be ranked from a pareto optimal-
ity perspective; therefore we concentrate on those equilibria that leave the agents with the maximum
expected payoffs.10 We assume that agents can coordinate over those equilibria when it is mutually
beneficial.
10This criteria for selecting equilibria satisfies also the NITS condition of Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008).
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3.1 Actions and Communication: Transmitting and Using Information
We proceed by backward induction and we analyze the communication and decision making stages for a
given organizational design (allocation of decisions rights and a compensation scheme), and the amount
of information acquired by local managers. Each local manager i has private information about market
characteristic in his own region, θi. We solve how information is transmitted by managers and used by
decision makers for one product. The solution is similar for both products, and follows from Alonso,
Dessein and Matouscheck (2008).
Under centralization, the headquarters communicates with each local manager and forms beliefs about
local demand characteristics, i.e., E[θ1] and E[θ2], and chooses the firm’s product strategy solving
max
a1,a2
E[U1+U2] = E[pi1+pi2] = E[K(β )− (a1−θ1)2− (a2−θ2)2−2β (a1−a2)2].
Under decentralization, local managers communicate between them, form beliefs about the other man-
ager’s action, i.e., manager 1 forms beliefs E[a2], and chooses his action solving
max
a1
E[U1] = E[(1− s)pi1+ spi2] = E[K(β )− (1− s)(a1−θ1)2− s(a2−θ2)2−β (a1−a2)2].
The following proposition characterizes the optimal actions under centralization and decentralization.
Proposition 1. 1.a Conditioned on beliefs, the optimal actions under centralization are
aC1 (m1,m2) =
1+2β
1+4β
E[θ1|m1]+ 2β1+4β E[θ2|m2], and
aC2 (m1,m2) =
2β
1+4β
E[θ1|m1]+ 1+2β1+4β E[θ2|m2].
1.b Conditioned on beliefs defined by E2[θ1]≡ E2[θ1|m1] and E1[θ2]≡ E1[θ2|m2], the optimal actions
under decentralization are
aD1 (m1,m2,θ1) =
(1− s)
(1− s+β )θ1+
β
(1− s+β )
[
β
1− s+2β E2[θ1]+
1− s+β
1− s+2β E1[θ2]
]
, and
aD2 (m1,m2,θ2) =
(1− s)
(1− s+β )θ2+
β
(1− s+β )
[
β
1− s+2β E1[θ2]+
1− s+β
1− s+2β E2[θ1]
]
.
Proposition 1 is based on Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (forthcoming).
Optimal decision making reveals that local managers cannot truthfully transmit the information acquired.
Let mi ≡ E j[θi|mi] be the receiver j’s expectation of θi after receiving the message mi.11 Each local
manager has incentives to lie in order to improve the profits of his own division. The intrinsic incentives
to lie under decentralization are m1−θ1 = (1−2s)(1−s+β )s(1−s)+β θ1≡ωDθ1 and under centralization are m1−θ1 =
(1−2s)β
1−s+β θ1 ≡ ωCθ1. Given these incentives to lie, the only incentive compatible communication for the
sender is, as described in Crawford and Sobel (1982), a partition of the state space. Recall that we
11After sending a message m1, the receiver forms a posterior of m1 about θ1. Communication is not perfect when the
posterior m1 and the real value θ1 differ.
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have assumed that demand’s characteristic of product j is uniformly distributed in [−θ j,θ j]. Then, we
characterize the truthfully revealing partitions and communication equilibria.
Proposition 2. Fix two positive integers N1 and N2, there exists at least one Perfect Bayesian Nash equi-
librium characterized by the functions (υ1(m1|θ1),υ2(m2|θ2),a1(m2,m1,θ1),a2(m1,m2,θ2),g1(θ2|m2),g2(θ1|m1)).
The communication rule υi(mi|θi), decision rule ai(mi,m−i,θi), and beliefs gi(θ−i|m−i) satisfy:
2 .a υi(mi|θi) is uniform, with support on [di,h−1,di,h] if θi ∈ [di,h−1,di,h].
2 .b gi(θ−i|m−i) is uniform, with support on [di,h−1,di,h] if m−i ∈ [di,h−1,di,h].
2 .c The boundaries are defined by: i) di,h+1−di,h = di,h−di,h−1+4 (1−2s)(1−s+β )s(1−s)+β di,h for h= 1, ...,Ni−1
under decentralization; and ii) di,h+1−di,h = di,h−di,h−1+4 (1−2s)β1−s+β di,h for h = 1, ...,Ni−1 under
centralization.
2 .d The decision of each worker is defined by part 1.b of Proposition 1 under decentralization and by
part 1.a of Proposition 1 under centralization.
Taking the boundaries d0 =−θ and dN = θ of the space, the solution is defined by
dh = θ
xh(1+ yN)− yh(1+ xN)
xN− yN 0≤ h≤ N,
with x= (1+2ω)+
√
(1+2ω)2−1 and y= (1+2ω)−
√
(1+2ω)2−1, ω =ωD≡ (1−2s)(1−s+β )s(1−s)+β under
decentralization, and ω = ωC ≡ (1−2s)β1−s+β under centralization. Note that xy = 1, x > 1 and y < 1.
Proposition 2 is based on Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008), and Rantakari (forthcoming).
Proposition 2 describes the communication equilibria with N-partition of the space [−θ j,θ j]. After
communication takes place, the successful rate of communication is E[m2i ] = Viσ2j , where Vi represents
the proportion of the local information variance (σ2j ≡
θ 2j
3 ) that is communicated. The rate Vi is increasing
in the number of partitions N. The equilibria with +∞-partition are the ones that achieve the maximum
expected payoffs for both managers. Onwards, we concentrate on these +∞-partitions equilibria, which
deliver the rate of transmission equal to Vj = 3+3ω3+4ω , with ω ∈ {ωC,ωD}.12
After information is acquired there are two costs in the communication and action stages. One cost is
related with how well information is used, and is characterized byΛ in equation (1). Under centralization,
the headquarters achieves the minimum cost, given that it maximizes total expected profits with the
information available. Under decentralization, however, each local manager has a bias to the profit of his
own division and does not internalize the externality that the decision about product strategy has on the
other division.
The second cost is associated with information transmission and is characterized by Γ(1−V ) in
equation (1). The factor V represents how well information is communicated between the ones who have
the information and the ones who make decisions, i.e., how accurate communication is. The factor Γ
12These equilibria satisfy the Non Incentives To Separate (NITS) criteria of Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) when the number
of partitions is infinite. For finite partitions, it satisfies NITS if the number of partitions is odd.
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Figure 3: Comparing payoffs under centralization and decentralization (a) and comparing the
value generated and the value appropriated (b) by each manager .
represents how important this communication is for the expected profits, i.e., the value of communica-
tion accuracy. Under centralization there is more accurate communication than under decentralization
because under the former the conflict between each manager and headquarters is lower, i.e., there is
less incentive to exaggerate the private information. However, the value of that communication is also
higher under centralization. The information that is not communicated under centralization is lost, in the
sense that nobody can use that information for making decisions. Under decentralization, however, local
managers use, at least, their own information for making their own decisions.
We identify these costs for each local manager under both centralization and decentralization. The
expected profits of each division in each product are described in the following lemma. To avoid awkward
notation we focus on local manager 1.
Lemma 1. Under both structures the expected profit function for each local manager is characterized
by
E[Π1] = K−
 Λ1+Γ11(1−V1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to 1 information
+ Λ1+Γ21(1−V2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to 2 information
σ2θ . (1)
with the following expressions for centralization VC =
3(1−s)(1+2β )
(1−2s)β+3(1−s)(1+2β ) , Λ1C =
β
1+4β , Γ11C = 1−
Λ1C, and Γ12C = −Λ1C. For decentralization the values are VD = 3(1−s)(1−s+2β )(1−2s)(1−s+β )+3(1−s)(1−s+2β ) , Λ1D =
β [(1−s)2+β ]
(1−s+2β )2 , Γ11D =
β [(1−s)2+β ]
(1−s+β )2 −Λ1D, and Γ12D = β
(1−s)2
(1−s+β )2 −Λ1D.
Lemma 1 describes the situation under perfect information (the algebra for constructing these expres-
sions are in Appendix 7). In brace we identify the value generated in region 1 by the information of
manager 1 and manager 2.
Summarizing the results of this section, we have characterized the value of information under both
11
centralization and decentralization. After information is acquired, it is transmitted and used through local
managers to decision makers. Under both centralization and decentralization, the value of information
increases in incentive alignment, s. Misaligning incentives (reducing s) reduces the value of information
under both structures. This effect is higher under decentralization if s≤ s. Hence, the value of informa-
tion is higher under centralization if incentives are sufficiently misaligned, i.e., s low.13 In Figure 3.a,
we show the relation of the value generated in the communication and action stages under centralization
(continuous line) and decentralization (dashed line) as a function of the compensation scheme s.
3.2 Acquiring Information
Let us assume now that information is imperfect and costly. Each manager invests an effort e in acquiring
an imperfect signal θˆ of the true value θ . The realization of the signal θˆ equals the true value θ with
probability
√
e and a random draw from the same distribution of θ with probability 1−√e. The higher
the effort, the more accurate the signal. Following Rantakari (2010) we use e as a measure of the quality
of primary information which has a cost µ(t)C(e)σ2 with e ∈ [0,1] and C(e) =−(e+ log(1− e)).
We first describe the objective functions with imperfect signals, and then we point out the private
incentives of managers and the headquarters to acquire information. Finally, we characterize how infor-
mation is acquired.
Acquiring information of quality ei by local manager i, with i ∈ {1,2}, with the corresponding cost
of acquiring that information means that now the expected profits of division i in equation (1) becomes,
(see Appendix 7)
E[Πi] = K−
1− ei [1−Λi−Γii(1−Vi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to i information
+ek [Λi+Γki(1−Vk)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to k information
+µC(ei)
σ2θ , i = {1,2} and k 6= i. (2)
Since local managers do not internalize the externality that their own information generates on the other
manager, we distinguish between the profit captured by each local manager, E[Πi], and the profit gen-
erated by each local manager, E[pii]. Despite the fact that these values are not the same pii Q Πi, the
aggregate profit captured equals the aggregate profit generated, i.e., ∑i=1,2pii =∑i=1,2Πi. The profit cap-
tured by a local manager is represented in equation (2); however, the profit generated by a local manager
is
E[pii] = K−
1− ei [1− (Λi+Λk)− (Γii+Γik)(1−Vi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ψii due to information of manager i
+µC(ei)
σ2θ . (3)
where ψii represents the value generated by manager i with a signal of precision ei. A local manager
acquires information considering the effect that his own information has on his own payoff and not on the
value that the information generates. For this reason there is an inefficiency in information acquisition.
13For extension 4.1 it is worth noting that, under both centralization and decentralization, the value of information is decreas-
ing in local divisions’ integration, β . The cutoff s(β ) is increasing in β . Increasing local divisions’ integration (increasing β )
reduces the value of information under both structures but more under decentralization.
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Given g and s the expected utility of each manager over a product is E[Ui] = (1− s)E[Πi]+ sE[Πk] or,
E[Ui] = K+
[
−1+ eiψ˜ii+ ekψ˜ki−µC(ei)
]
σ2θ , (4)
where ψ˜ii represents the value appropriated by manager i with a signal of precision ei, ψ˜ki is the ex-
ternality to manager i generated by manager k who has acquired a signal of precision ek. The expres-
sions are defined by ψ˜ii ≡ (1− s)[1−Λi−Γii(1−Vi)]− s[Λk +Γik(1−Vi)], ψ˜ki ≡ s[1−Λk−Γkk(1−
Vk)]− (1− s)[Λi + Γki(1−Vk)], ψ˜kk ≡ (1− s)[1−Λk − Γkk(1−Vk)]− s[Λi + Γki(1−Vk)] and ψ˜ik ≡
s[1−Λi−Γii(1−Vi)]− (1− s)[Λk +Γik(1−Vi)]. It is important to notice (Figure 3.b) that the value
of the information captured by a local manager, ψ˜(s,g), is decreasing in s under both centralization and
decentralization. However, the value of information generated ψ(s,g) is increasing in s under both cen-
tralization and decentralization. Becauseψi 6= ψ˜ii, the information acquired is not optimal. The following
lemma describes the effort choice
Lemma 2. Under both decentralization and centralization the effort choice is characterized as follows:
2.a The optimal level of effort is given by ψ = µC′(e∗).
2.b Each local manager chooses effort according to ψ˜ = µC′(eˆ).
The comparative static implies that ∂e∂µ =− C
′(e)
µC′′(e) < 0,
∂e∗
∂ s > 0 and
∂ eˆ
∂ s < 0 under both centralization and
decentralization, since ∂ψ∂ s > 0 and
∂ψ˜
∂ s < 0. For the function C(e) = −(e+ log(1− e)), eˆ = ψ˜µ+ψ˜ and
e∗ = ψµ+ψ .
The proof of Lemma 2 consists in solving the first order condition of the objective function respect
to e. The objective function is defined by equation 3 in part 2.a of Lemma 2 and by equation 4 in
part 2.b of Lemma 2. The information acquired by a local manager eˆ is decreasing in his incentive
alignment s because it depends on the perceived value of that information, ψ˜ , while the optimal amount
of information is increasing in incentive alignment, s, because it depends on the real value of information,
ψ .
So far, we have described the incentives to exert effort for acquiring information, e, and how much
value that information generates, ψ(s). Under both structures, centralization and decentralization, local
managers face similar trade-offs. A manager effort increases but the value generated decreases when
local managers incentives are narrowed to their own division’s profit. Under decentralization, however,
the perceived value of information tends to be greater than under centralization.14
In this paper efforts are neither strategic complement nor strategic substitutes, since strategic effects
cancel out due to the following assumptions: 1) independence of θ j1 and θ j2 (for j∈{A,B}); 2) messages
m1 and m2 are unrelated in the communication game; and 3) the functional form of the profit function.15
Relaxing these assumptions to capture the strategic interaction of the efforts appears a promising avenue
for future research.
14ψ˜ is greater under decentralization except when β is excessively high and s excessively low. The advantage of decen-
tralization is that a local manager uses his own information to adapt his product to his local market. Managers value more
the information under decentralization except in some extreme circumstances where standardization is very important and
compensation schemes are narrowed to local divisions’ profits.
15Appendix 7 shows the form of the expected profit function under both structures.
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3.3 Resource Allocation
Again subindex j ∈ {A,B} stands for product A and product B respectively. Local managers have re-
sources equal to 1 which are allocated to acquire information about different demands’ tastes. The
allocation of these resources determines the marginal cost of information, i.e., µA(tA) and µB(tB), where
tA+ tB ≤ 1. The objective function of the headquarters is ∑i=1,2 E[piiA]+E[piiB],
∑
i=1,2
{
K− [1− eiAψA+µAC(eiA)]σ2A
}
+
{
K− [1− eiBψB+µBC(eiB)]σ2B
}
. (5)
Note that E[piiA]+E[piiB] is the value generated by local manager i within the firm. The objective function
of a local manager in division i is E[UiA]+E[UiB]
{K−σ2A[1− eiAψ˜iiA− ekAψ˜kiA+µAC(eiA)]}+{K−σ2B[1− eiBψ˜iiB− ekBψ˜kiB+µBC(eiB)]}. (6)
We analyze two situations. As a benchmark case we analyze the optimal resource allocation, i.e.,
how the headquarters allocates resources within each division. The headquarters chooses tAi for local
manager i maximizing the expected profit in equation (34) subject to optimal choice of effort described
in part 2.b of Lemma 2. In the second case, local managers allocate resources. Each manager chooses tA
and tB maximizing his expected payoff defined in equation (38). In the following lemma we summarize
how resource allocation is chosen.
Lemma 3. The resource allocation tA within each division is determined as follows:
3.a The headquarters chooses tA according to
−∂µA
∂ tA
σ2A
[
C(eA)− ∂eA∂µA [ψA−µAC
′(eA)]
]
=−∂µB
∂ tB
σ2B
[
C(eB)− ∂eB∂µB [ψB−µBC
′(eB)]
]
. (7)
Replacing ψ˜ = µC′(e) we have [ψ−ψ˜] as a measure of the moral hazard problem in each product
market.
3.b A local manager chooses tA according to16
−∂µA
∂ tA
C(eiA)σ2A = −
∂µB
∂ tB
C(eiB)σ2B. (8)
We assume that µ(t) is sufficiently convex for an interior solution to exist.17 A comparative static
shows that more resources are allocated to learn about a product when more information is acquired, i.e.,
higher e, and when the product has higher returns to differentiation, i.e., higher σ2. In effect, information
acquisition and resource allocation are complementary. There are incentives to allocate more resources
in markets where managers acquire more information, e.g., the higher eA the higher tA. Also more
information is acquired in markets that receive more resources, the higher tA the higher eA.
As noted in the Section 3.2, the effort in information acquisition of local managers is not efficient,
and thus their allocation of resources will also be distorted. Indeed, if the information is acquired effi-
16We apply envelope theorem to get this condition.
17The convexity of resource allocation outweighs the effort convexity problem and incentive alignment convexity problem.
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ciently, the term ∂e∂µ [ψ − µC′(e)] disappears due to part 2.a of Lemma 2 and the resource allocation is
always characterized by part 2.b of Lemma 3. The headquarters corrects this inefficiency in information
acquisition through resource allocation as described in part 3.a of Lemma 3, or through organizational
design, as is described below in the following section.
Whenever local managers allocate resources, they choose tA considering the opportunity cost of those
resources on their own expected utility. This is consistent with Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) who
conclude “that managers at each level optimally focus attention only on those variables that determine
the marginal productivity of resources and the marginal costs of production in the units under their
command”. As described above, the choice of tA is only affected by the returns to differentiation σ2
and the function C(e). Hence, to reallocate resources in favor of market A, the headquarters not only
can promote a more considerable effort in market A, increasing C(eA), but also can discourage effort in
market B, reducing C(eB).
If σ2A = σ2B, there is a symmetric allocation of resources and identical effort. Note from Lemma 3.b
that the allocation of resources is symmetric only if eA = eB, and from Lemma 2.a we can have identical
effort if resource allocation is symmetric.
The function C(e) =−(e+ log(1− e)) has a slope C′(e) = e1−e . For the function µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
, with
b ∈ (0,1) and µ ∈ R++, the resource allocation choice is tA = 1
1+H
1
1+b
with18
H1 ≡ C(eiB)C(eiA)
σ2B
σ2A
and H0 ≡
C(eiB)− ∂eB∂µB [ψB−µBC′(eB)]
C(eiA)− ∂eA∂µA [ψA−µAC′(eA)]
σ2B
σ2A
.
The term is H1 when resource allocation is decided by each local manager and H0 when resource allo-
cation is chosen by the headquarters. The cost of acquiring information is µA(tA) = µ0.5b
(
1+H
1
1+b
)b
.
The following Lemma is crucial for our results.
Lemma 4. Define t∗ as the value that maximizes [−µ(t)− µ(1− t)H]. Assume µ(t,b) = µ (0.5t )b and
0<H ≤ 1. Given b0 ∈ [0,1], the set of all functions with b1 ∈ [b0,1] satisfies the property that µ(t∗0 ,b0)≥
µ(t∗1 ,b1).
The proof of the Lemma 4 is in Section 6.1. This Lemma describes that if resource allocation is more
important, then the marginal cost of acquiring information is lower in the market with higher variance.
In other words, a higher b implies lower µA and higher µB if σ2A > σ2B. Consequently, b represents the
importance of resource allocation.
3.4 Optimal Structure
To find the optimal structure of the firm, we must evaluate the best response of local managers for each
possible structure and compare the total expected payoff obtained under each possible combination of
decision rights, i.e., centralization and decentralization in each product market. The problem is as follows
max
g,s ∑i=1,2
{
K− [1− eiAψA+µAC(eiA)]σ2A
}
+
{
K− [1− eiBψB+µBC(eiB)]σ2B
}
, (9)
18With the properties µ ′(t) =−bµ
(
0.5b
t1+b
)
< 0, µ ′′(t) = b(1+b)µ
(
0.5b
t2+b
)
> 0, ∂µ
′(t)
∂b < 0, and
∂µ ′′(t)
∂b > 0.
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subject to the optimal effort choice described in part 2.b of Lemma 2 and resource allocation choice
described in part 3.a of Lemma 3, in the benchmark case where the headquarters chooses t, or part 3.b
in Lemma 3, when local managers choose t. For simplicity, we assume σ2B ≡ 1, such that the ratio of
market variances is equal to the variance of product A, i.e., σ
2
A
σ2B
≡ σ2A, with σ2A ≥ 1 since θA ≥ θB.19 The
first order conditions for the propositions of this section are in Appendix 7.
We first analyze the situation when resource allocation is not important, i.e., b→ 0, as an starting point
to understand our benchmark case, where the headquarters allocates resources, and our first extension,
where managers do. For this case, the optimal design for market A is independent of the optimal design
for market B. In the following proposition we summarize the result.
Proposition 3. Assume µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b→ 0. There exists a threshold µ˜ above which centralization
outperforms decentralization and the choice of decision rights is independent of market of product A and
market of product B.
In Appendix 6.2 we develop a sketch of the formal proof in Rantakari (2010). We provide here
some useful intuition for our next results. As explained in Section 3.1 and represented in Figure 3.a,
centralization performs better than decentralization when the incentives of each local manager and the
headquarters are sufficiently misaligned, i.e., s is low. The main trade off in designing the compensation
scheme, i.e., in choosing s, is clearly observed in the first order condition respect to s,
∂e
∂ s
[ψ− ψ˜]+ e∂ψ
∂ s
= 0. (10)
The first term in the left hand side is negative, since ∂e∂ s is negative, and the second term is positive. When
the manager’s payoff depends more on total firm’s profit, i.e., higher s, there is an increase in the value
of the information acquired, e ∂ψ∂ s , but also an increment in the value of acquiring further information
∂e
∂ s [ψ− ψ˜], because ψ increases in s while ψ˜ decreases in s. When the cost of information is low, there is
a lot of information acquisition, and the headquarters aligns managers’ incentives with the firm’s profits to
increase the value of that information. In this case, decentralization performs better than centralization.
When the cost of information is high, the headquarters prioritizes information acquisition, narrowing
local managers incentives to their own division profit, and, eventually, the firm performs better under
centralization.
The structure of the firm balances the moral hazard problem of suboptimal information acquisition
with the suboptimal value generated by this information in the decision making process. When informa-
tional cost is low, the headquarters follows a strategy of product differentiation through decentralization,
but when informational cost is high, it follows a strategy of product standardization through centraliza-
tion.
Although it is not directly stated, we can infer by Proposition 3 that when centralization performs as
well as decentralization, the compensation scheme under both structures differs, i.e., sC < sD. Assume
that the informational cost is just the threshold µ˜ , and the headquarters is indifferent to centralizing or
decentralizing decision making. This indifference between centralization and decentralization requires
19The absolute value of market variances matters if we endogenize β . For robustness, we describe the results in the case that
the headquarters also chooses β in Section 4.1.
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that s ≤ s.20 Figure 3.a (Section 3.1) shows that when s ≤ s the value of information is more sensitive
to s under decentralization than under centralization. Hence, at the same informational cost, the optimal
profit sharing s under centralization must be lower than the profit sharing under decentralization, i.e.,
sC < sD. This result arises because, once the headquarters provides incentives for information acquisition,
centralization handles better, at the margin, the trade-off between acquiring and transmitting information.
Then, it can foster more information acquisition through a lower s under centralization.
Summing up the result of Proposition 3, when b→ 0, resource allocation is not important, and the
marginal cost of information is given by µ in each market. The headquarters decentralizes decision
making in both markets if µ ≤ µ˜ , and centralizes them otherwise. Let us now see how the optimal
structure changes as resource allocation becomes important.
Proposition 4. Assume µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b ∈ (0,1) and µ ∈R++. If resources are allocated efficiently,
that is by the Headquarters, there exists a threshold in the ratio of returns to product differentiation σ˜AB
above which the optimal design requires a mix structure with centralization in market of product B and
decentralization in market of product A. Moreover, ∂ σ˜AB∂b < 0.
Proof. The headquarters chooses tA and tB according to condition (7) in Lemma 3. We guarantee an
interior solution in resource allocation when the function µ(t) is sufficiently convex. The allocation of
tA is increasing in the ratio σ2A, implying that µB(1− tA) is increasing in σ2A, and µA(tA) is decreasing in
σ2A. The resource allocation, that is tA, defines the costs’ values µA and µB, and Proposition 3 applies
in each market: if µ j > µ˜ , centralization outperforms decentralization, but if µ j < µ˜ , decentralization
outperforms centralization in market of product j. The proof of ∂ σ˜AB∂b < 0 is in appendix 4.
Proposition 4 has several implications for the optimal internal design of the firm and, consequently, the
optimal firm’s product strategy. First, the headquarters recognizes that the value of information is higher
in markets with higher returns to differentiation than in markets with lower returns to differentiation. The
reason is straightforward: the expected losses of a wrong product strategy are higher when consumers’
tastes are more uncertain. Hence, the optimal resource allocation concentrates more resources in markets
with higher returns to differentiation. This is shown in Lemma 3.a: the higher the ratio σ2A, the more
resources the firm allocates to learn about product A and the fewer resources the firm allocates to learn
about product B demand characteristics. Thus, there is higher informational cost and less information
acquisition in market of product B, and lower informational cost and more information acquisition in
market of product A.
Second, the headquarters recognizes that the information acquired by local managers is suboptimal in
both markets. The suboptimal level of effort, however, is more important in a market with higher returns
to differentiation. Through resource allocation, the headquarters reduces the effort cost and encourages
more learning in the market with higher returns to differentiation.
As the ratio of the returns to differentiation between markets increases, more resources are allocated to
market A and fewer to market B. The headquarters will, eventually, find it optimal to follow a strategy of
product differentiation in market A and a strategy of product standardization in market B. To implement
these strategies, the headquarters decentralizes decision making in market A, providing a compensation
20Since for s > s, not only decentralization generates more value for a given effort e, i.e., ψD > ψC, but also local managers
exert a higher effort, i.e., eD > eC since ψ˜D > ψ˜C.
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scheme that aligns local managers’ incentives with the firm’s profits. In market B, however, since the
aim is to pursue standardization, it is better to centralize decision making with a compensation scheme
that narrows local managers incentives to their own divisions’ profit.
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Figure 4: Optimal decision making as a function of the ratio in returns (we assume σ2B = 1) and
informational cost.
Figure 4 shows the relation between informational cost µ and returns to differentiation for each mar-
ket when resources are allocated by the headquarters, for the particular case that µ < µ˜ . If µ < µ˜ , the
headquarters decentralizes decision rights in both markets if σ2A < σ˜2A and chooses a mix decentralizing
decisions about product A and centralizing decisions about product B otherwise. If µ > µ˜ , however,
there exists σ˘2A such that the headquarters centralizes decision rights in both markets if σ2A > σ˘2A and
chooses a mix decentralizing decisions about product A and centralizing decisions about product B oth-
erwise. Figure 5.a shows in blue the optimal compensation scheme as a function of the returns to product
differentiation for a numerical example.21
Rantakari (forthcoming) describes a positive causal relation between returns to product differentiation
(that he calls volatility) and decentralization. If decision rights are centralized in our model, an increment
in product A’s returns to differentiation can motivate the headquarters to decentralize the decision right of
product A. Rantakari (forthcoming) drives this causality through a change in the needs for coordination
β , while we drive this causality through a reallocation of resources.
There is an ongoing discussion on the literature about how exogenous is the coordination need.22
In any case, most authors agree that not all elements of the structure (e.g., contracts, decision rights,
divisional integration) can be modified with the same ease and speed. An organization can revise the
compensation scheme or its allocation of decision rights more often than its degree of integration which
may require updating the equipment, logistic, and information technologies.23 Our mechanism is more
21For this example β = 4, µ = 0.65, b = 0.5.
22Some authors argue that the headquarters is free to decide the degree of integration between the two different units (See
Rantakari (2010)). Some other authors, however, believe that the need for coordination is an exogenous constraint given by
technology, legal environment, culture, etc. (See Alonso, et al (2008) and Dessein, Garicano and Gertner (2010)).
23Eccles and Holland (1989) describe the case of Suchard when European Union merges most western european markets as
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direct than Rantakari (forthcoming)’s one, and we can account for transitory decentralization. Neverthe-
less, our results are robust to endogenize the needs for coordination that we develop in an extension.
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Figure 5: Optimal contract when the headquarters allocates resources (blue) and when local man-
agers allocate resources (red).
In the following proposition we point out that our previous result is robust to the case where managers
can decide or affect the allocation of resources. We show that, despite the headquarters can not control
the allocation of resources, there exists a cutoff in the ratio of returns to differentiation above which the
optimal structure combines decentralization and centralization. When the headquarters has no control
over resources, she modifies the strategy of the firm to capture as much benefit as possible from resource
allocation.
Proposition 5. Assume µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b ∈ (0,1) and µ ∈ R++. When local managers allocate
resources, there exists a threshold for the ratio of market returns to product differentiation σˆ2A(µ˜) above
which the optimal design requires a mixed structure with centralization in market of product B and
decentralization in market of product A. Moreover, σ˜2A ≤ σˆ2A.
Proposition 5 claims that our result even though managers control the allocation of resources. How-
ever, there are two effects that make the relation less intensive, generating a less intensive relation be-
tween returns to differentiation and the mixed structure, i.e., σ˜2A ≤ σˆ2A. Let’s assume σ2A = σ˜2A and µ < µ˜ ,
which means that decentralization is optimal if markets have similar returns to differentiation, i.e., if
ratio σ2A ∼ 1. Compared with Proposition 4 both effects favour decentralization in the market with low
dispersion, i.e., they favour a strategy of product differentiation in market B.
a unique market. It took several years and lots of resources for the company to adapt the company to the new situation. Thomas
(2011) also mentions how the market structure of western european markets modifies the needs for standardization. Procter &
Gamble and Unilever reorganized their production after the pass of European Regulations in 1992. Firms have spent a lot of
time and resources to launch programs to reduce the number of products and to centralize production in fewer plants, e.g., “path
to growth” (Unilever in 2000), “Unilever 2010” (Unilever in 2004) and “Organization 2005” (Procter & Gamble in 1999). The
program of Unilever included “a more streamlined brand portfolio, moving from 1600 brands in 1999 to a target number of 400
by the end of 2004”. “P&G aimed to improve supply chain management of the proliferation of product, pricing, labeling, and
packaging variations”.
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First, the headquarters would allocate more resources in the market with high returns to differentiation
than local managers in fact do. Local managers allocate more resources to learn about the resources
according to the condition in Lemma 3.b. The cost of acquiring information changes with the ratio
of markets’ return to product differentiation, i.e., tA and µB increase with ratio σ2A, and µA decreases
with σ2A. However, as local managers do not internalize the effect that resources can have in reducing
the inefficiency in information acquisition, they allocate more resources in markets with low return to
product differentiation. This favors decentralization in markets with low return to product differentiation.
Second, to correct the manager’s misallocation of resources in favor of markets with high returns to
differentiation, the headquarters changes the organizational design of the firm. Lemma 3.b describes how
local managers allocate resources. The headquarters takes advantage of the complementarity between
information acquisition and resource allocation to promote not only more information acquisition in
those markets with high return to differentiation but also less information acquisition in markets with
low return to differentiation. The headquarters implements this change through incentives alignment in
markets with low return to differentiation and incentives misalignment in markets with high return to
differentiation. These changes in structure, however, may also affect the firm’s product strategy.
These two channels increase the likelihood that the headquarters chooses decentralization in market
B, as a way to overcome the inefficiency in manager’s resource allocation. The ratio of returns σ2A must
be higher for the mixed structure of decentralization and centralization to be optimal.
Summarizing, the externalities in information sharing generate suboptimal information acquisition.
The headquarters alleviates this inefficiency allocating more resources to the markets where the problem
is more serious, i.e., the markets with high return to product differentiation. However, when lacking
control over resources, she uses the internal design of the firm, allocating decisions rights and modifying
the compensation scheme to correct the effect of resource allocation. Hence, resource allocation and
decision rights are imperfect substitutes in the sense that controlling resources leads to a mix strategy of
centralization and decentralization, but lacking control derives in a decentralized organization.
By symmetry, we can analyze the implications of Proposition 5 for the case with µ > µ˜ , in which
case the optimal organizational design when the ratio σ2A is small requires centralizing decision making
and a mix structure arises when the ratio σ2A of the returns to differentiation is high.
Figure 5.b shows how the optimal contract depends on the ratio of returns to product differentiation
in a numerical example. The aligning of incentives is higher in the market with higher returns. There
are more returns to differentiation than in the other market. The difference in alignment increases with
the ratio of returns to product differentiation. There is a threshold above which the organizational design
changes, centralizing decisions about the product with lower returns. This change also affects the con-
tract. The objectives functions depend more on the local division profits to motivate more information
acquisition in both markets, however they are more misaligned in the centralized product.
Our results can be empirically identified in at least two ways. First, comparing multi-product multi-
market firms with single-product multi-market firms and observing that there may be differences in their
organizational design. This identification strategy is relevant since there are differences in organizational
structure of firms operating in the same market that cannot be explained either by demand differences or
by supply conditions or retailers environment. In this paper we offer a framework for differences that are
born within internal organization.
A second way to identify our result is comparing multi-product multi-market firms along time. If there
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is a shock affecting the returns to product differentiation of some particular product, a firm can modify
its organizational design to increase its profits. However, it may be difficult to observe this case because
firms might modify informally their organizational design without changing formals procedures.24
4 Extensions
4.1 Coordination
In the previous section we discuss that in some papers the level of coordination among divisions is
endogenous, while in some others is exogenous. Our results hold if we endogenize this choice. We
extend results of Propositions 4 and 5 for the case that the headquarters chooses β . Figure 6.a shows the
extension of Proposition 3, Figure 6.b of Proposition 4, and Figure 7 of Proposition 5.
The choice of β does not modify our previous results qualitatively, even when it does quantitatively.
If the headquarters decides the optimal β for the structure of the organization, there is a negative relation
between β and σ2. There is a high risk of requiring high levels of coordination between local managers,
as long as there is high uncertainty about demand characteristics, i.e., high σ2. For high values of σ2 the
headquarters prefers to provide autonomy to local managers about what products to be offered in their
markets and to follow a strategy of product differentiation, i.e., the higher σ2 the lower β .
Analogously, the headquarters follows a standard product strategy in those markets with low returns
to product differentiation. The effect of losing control over resources would also affect the decision of β .
For details see Appendix 8.2. For the function µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b ∈ (0,1), there exists a cutoff σ˜2(µ)
and increasing relations σ˜2AM(σ2B,µ), σ˜2A(σ2B,µ), σ˜2BM(σ2A,µ) and σ˜2B(σ2A,µ) such that:
a- If resources are allocated efficiently (headquarters), decision rights over market j are centralized
if σ2j < σ˜2j (σ2− j,µ), for j ∈ {A,B}.
b- If resources are allocated by local managers, decision rights over market j are centralized if σ2j <
σ˜2jM(σ2− j,µ), for j ∈ {A,B}.
c- σ˜2A(σ2B,µ)< σ˜2AM(σ2B,µ) and σ˜2B(σ2A,µ)< σ˜2BM(σ2A,µ).
Centralization is chosen as an optimal structure if the return to product differentiation is sufficiently
low, which is more likely for higher informational cost µ . This relation is shown in Figure 6.a. We
remark now the effect of resource allocation on the headquarters decision over centralization and de-
centralization. When resource allocation becomes important, the headquarters promotes a lower cost
in markets with high returns to differentiation. Not only the ratio of the returns to differentiation but
also the level of the returns to differentiation matter in all markets to determine whether to centralize or
decentralize decision rights.
24For instance, suppose a centralized organization with a formal procedure to introduce new products through the following
procedure: a country manager writes a project suggesting a product which requires Headquarters’ approval; however, the
headquarters can commit (through reputation) to relax its approval requirements over those projects related to some particular
products’ lines or segments. This is interpreted as informal decentralization. I have been informally told by managers in
international companies that this is a common proceeding.
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A low β fits better in a market with high return to differentiation, which also makes decentralization
more attractive. On markets with high returns to differentiation, the cutoff ratio that makes the head-
quarters to centralize decision making in some markets increases. These thresholds are represented by
increasing relations in Figure 6.b. As in our baseline analysis, these thresholds are higher when the
headquarters lacks control over resources, which is shown in Figure 7.a. Relations are steeper when the
resource allocation is more important in determining the information cost µ , as shown in Figure 7.b.
tionCentraliza
2σ
µ
)(2 µσ
µ
zationDecentrali
2
A
σ
)(~ 22
AB
σσ
)(µα
2
B
2
A with line º45 σσ =)(~
22
ABM
σσ
CBCA,
DBDA,
CBDA,
DBCA,
A
2
A
σ
2
B
σ
)(µα
substitution between
tA and tB
)(~ 22
AB
B σσ≡
)(2 µσ
A
)(2 µσ
B
(a) Comparing µ and σ2 (b) Comparing σ2A and σ2B
Figure 6: Optimal structure depending on marginal informational cost, µ , and market returns to
differentiation, σ2.
2
B
σ Lemma 5
2
A
σ
),(~ 22 ϕσσ
ABM
BM ≡
)(~ 22
AB
B σσ≡
)(~ 22
BA
A σσ≡),(~ 22 ϕσσ
BAM
AM ≡
)(2 µσ
A
)(2 µσ
B
CBCA,
DBDA,
CBDA,
DBCA,
0A
0B
2
B
σ
)(2 µσ
A
)(2 µσ
B
substitution between
tA and tB
1B
1A
2
A
σ
(a) Firm’s and Managers’ cutoff (b) Change in resource allocation importance
Figure 7: Optimal structure for change on the importance of resource allocation
4.2 Delegation
We assume that the headquarters delegates resource allocation on local division managers. We can
extend our model to see that delegation may arise as the optimal’s choice of the headquarters if there are
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externalities when learning about regional demands. For example, if learning about demand’s taste of
product B in region 1 can provide some additional information when learning about demand’s taste of
product A in region 1, the firm can prefer to merge two subdivisions in region 1. In this way, the firm
designs the organization by regional divisions, as many international firms do. Let us call subdivisions
A1 and B1 for the rest of this section.
Assume the following technology of the signal θˆ1A: the signal equals the true value θ1A with probabil-
ity
√
e1A+αe1B and a random draw from the same distribution of θ1A with probability 1−
√
e1A+αe1B,
with 0 < α < 1, and e ∈ [0, 11+α ].25 This technology of the signal generates an externality in information
acquisition that is described as follows:
1- If subdivisions A1 and B1 are separated, local manager in division A1 collects information accord-
ing to: ψ˜A(β ,s,g) = µAC′(eˆA).
2- If subdivisions A1 and B1 are integrated, local manager in division A1 collects information accord-
ing to: ψ˜A(β ,s,g)+
σ2B
σ2A
αψ˜B(β ,s,g) = µAC′(eˆA).
3- If effort were contractible, the headquarters would ask the local manager to collect information
according to: ψA+
σ2B
σ2A
αψB = µAC′(e∗A).
The net effect of this learning externality about market characteristics is intuitive. For the function
µ = µ
(0.5
t
)b
, the parameter b represents the discretion of local managers to reallocate resources, the
higher the b the higher the managers’ discretion. For a given value of α , integration is profitable if b is
sufficiently low. There will be a cutoff on b such that delegation is optimal as long as b is below that
value. As α increases, learning from products A and B becomes more complementary, which means
that products are less rival. The inefficiency in resource allocation is reduced. Although there are some
new insights, the main implications of this paper over the firm’s optimal structure remain. To see a
comparison of this problem with our previous model see Appendix 8.2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the internal design of a multi-product multi-division firm. We model the
economic interactions of being multi-product that arise in an organization. We focus on the effect that
the opportunity cost of resources has on decision making and compensation schemes.
Implementing a product differentiation policy on some products is more profitable than on other
products. This relative profitability generates an opportunity cost of allocating scarce resources in each
market. We show that the firm may prefer to centralize decision making in markets with lower returns to
differentiation and decentralize decision making in markets with high returns to differentiation.
Empirically our result can be observed comparing the organizational design of multi-product multi-
market firms with single-product multi-market firms. Alternatively, it can also be observed following
dynamic organizational changes of a multi-product multi-market firm that suffers shocks which modify
the relative returns to product differentiation.
25Introducing this change in the model does not modify the communication problem.
23
In this paper we have made a first move to extend the economic literature of organizational design
into the analysis of multi-product firms. Much of this literature focuses on internal economic problems
that frequently appear in international multi-product firms. Henceforth, an analysis of the multi-product
multi-division firm is not only important but also necessary. We show that the allocation of decision
rights and firm’s strategy is not independent among different products. This is in line with Roberts
(2004) who points out that “The structure [of the firm] does not follow strategy any more than strategy
follows structure”.
We have focused on the impact of the opportunity cost of resources on the internal organizational
design. It is still necessary to carry out further work on analyzing other economic interactions that
multinational firms face for being multi-product, e.g., interactions that arise on the demand side.
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6 Appendix A: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume µ = 1, µ(t) =
(0.5
t
)b
. Looking for t∗ that maximizes [−µ(t)−
µ(1− t)H] we find that t∗ = 1
1+(H)
1
1+b
and µ(t∗) = 0.5b
[
1+(H)
1
1+b
]b
. Since 0 < H ≤ 1 then t∗ ≥ 0.5.
We need to prove that µ(t∗) is decreasing in b for 0 < b < 1, i.e., ∂µ(t
∗)
∂b = µ(t
∗) ∂ logµ(t
∗)
∂b < 0. Taking
logarithm and derivating respect to b we have logµ(t∗) = b log0.5+b log
[
1+(H)
1
1+b
]
, and
d logµ(t∗)
db
= log0.5+ log
[
1+(H)
1
1+b
]
− (H)
1
1+b[
1+(H)
1
1+b
] b
(1+b)2
log(H) . (11)
Note in the last term of equation 11 that 1− t∗ ≡ (H)
1
1+b[
1+(H)
1
1+b
] and that 1− t∗ < 0.5. Working the last two
terms, equation 11 can be expressed as log0.5+ log [H2], with H2 ≡ ( 1H ) (1−t∗)b(1+b)2 +(H) 1+bt∗(1+b)2 . I need to
prove that H2 < 2.26 For the extreme case that t∗ = 0.5 and b = 1 we have that
( 1
H
) 1
8 +(H)
3
8 ≤ 2 if
0.008 < H ≤ 1. Note that the expression H2 decreases as b decreases or t∗ increases. For completing the
proof, we check these derivatives respect to b and t∗,
∂H2
∂b
=
(
1
H
) (1−t∗)b
(1+b)2
log(
1
H
)(1− t∗) 1−b
(1+b)3
− log(H)2− t
∗+bt∗
(1+b)3
(H)
1+bt∗
(1+b)2 > 0.
Since H ≤ 1, note that log(H)< 0 and log( 1H )> 0. And the derivative respect to t∗ is,
∂H2
∂ t∗
=−
(
1
H
) (1−t∗)b
(1+b)2
log(
1
H
)
b
(1+b)2
+ log(H)
b
(1+b)2
(H)
1+bt∗
(1+b)2 < 0.
Finally, we check that the derivative ∂µ(t
∗)
∂H =
b
1+b 0.5
b
[
1+(H)
1
1+b
]b−1
(H)
−b
1+b > 0 which implies that if
H decreases, then the cost µ(t∗) decreases and the cost µ(1− t∗) increases. The proof is complete.
26Recall that log0.5+ log2 = log1 = 0.
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Sketch of the proof. (Based on Proposition 5 of Rantakari (2010)) Consider the optimal structure design
for market A. We proceed in two steps: first determining the contract s under decentralization and under
centralization, and second, comparing which structure generates higher profits. The first order condition
respect to s shows a balance between less information which has more value and more information
which has less value: eA
∂ψA
∂ sA +
∂eA
∂ sA [ψA− ψ˜A] = 0. Since local managers appropriate the amount ψ˜ of
the value generated, ψ , they acquire a suboptimal amount of information, e. However, this inefficiency
can be partially corrected with the compensation scheme. A comparative static shows that incentives are
narrowed to local manager’s payoff when information is more expensive, i.e., ∂ s∂µ < 0. To have a good
balance between the amount of information acquired and the value generated with this information, e
and ψ respectively, the headquarters fosters information acquisition when it is expensive, even when this
reduces the value generated by the information acquireds.
Evaluated in the optimal compensation scheme, decentralization outperforms centralization if the
surplus value is greater, i.e., if eAψA−µAC(eA) is higher under decentralization than under centralization.
Recalling that: 1) e decreases and ψ increases when s increases; 2) s decreases when µ increases; 3) for
high values of s, ψ and ψ˜ are higher under decentralization, and for low values of s, ψ is higher under
centralization but ψ˜ is higher under decentralization; and finally 4) the information acquired increases
with the value appropriated by local managers, i.e., the higher the ψ˜ the higher the e.
Low µ generates high e, which allows the firm to increase s and to decentralize. In words, low cost of
information generates high amount of information, allowing the firm to increase the degree of incentives
alignment and to decentralize decision rights. This result follows directly from section 3.1 (based on
Alonso et al, 2008) and from section 3.2.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. For the last part of Proposition 4, we prove that the cutoff σ˜AB decreases with b. For a given σAB,
the higher the b the lower the µA and the higher the µB. Recall that t∗ and µB depend on H and b and
from Lemma 4 we have
∂µB(1− t∗)
∂b
= µB(1− t∗)∂ ln[µB(1− t
∗)]
∂b
> 0. (12)
A higher b implies a higher µB. At σ˜AB the headquarters is indifferent between centralizing and decen-
tralizing decision rights about product characteristics in market B. If b increases, µB increases and now
the headquarters strictly prefers to centralize decision rights in market of product B. The cutoff σ˜AB
decreases when b increases.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. When local managers allocate resources, headquarters internalizes an additional effect of modi-
fying the contract. Increasing sA not only reduces the amount of effort eA but also reduces the amount
of resources that a local managers allocate to acquire information about product A, which indirectly also
reduces the effort eA. Moreover, a reduction in tA fosters more information acquisition about product B.
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If the headquarters allocates resources, t∗A, the optimal sA is defined by
∂ψA
∂ sA eA +
∂eA
∂ sA (ψA− ψ˜A) = 0.
However, if local managers allocate resources the first order condition becomes:
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A) = − ∂ tA∂ sA
σ2B
σ2A
[σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψA− ψ˜A]+ ∂eB∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]
]
,
∂ψB
∂ sB
eB+
∂eB
∂ sB
(ψB− ψ˜B) = − ∂ tA∂ sB
[σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψA− ψ˜A]+ ∂eB∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]
]
.
With ∂ tA∂ sA < 0 and
∂ tA
∂ sB > 0, and calling ϕ ≡
σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA [ψA− ψ˜A]+
∂eB
∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]. These expressions separate
the indirect effect of sA on tA from the direct effect of sA on eA (similarly for sB). In Section 7.7.1 we
describe that each manager reaction to an increase in σ2A are
∂eA
∂σ2A
> 0, ∂eB∂σ2A
< 0 and ∂ tA∂σ2A
> 0. As σ2A
increases, more resources are allocated to product A; the HQ increases sA to increase ψA and it reduces
sB to increase ψ˜B fostering higher effort in market B, i.e., higher eB. Eventually, the headquarters chooses
to centralize decision making in product B and decentralize decision making in product A.
However, comparing with the situation where headquarters allocates resources, the indirect effects
make the cutoff σˆAB to be higher than σ˜AB. To show that σ˜AB < σˆAB we identify the two indirect effects
that foster the headquarters to decentralize product B when σAB is around σ˜AB. Let us assume that
σAB = σ˜AB. If this is the case and local managers allocate resources, the optimal organizational design,
for the case where µ < µ˜ , requires to decentralize decision making in both products.
First, since local managers ignore the inefficiency in exerting effort, represented by [ψ − ψ˜], they
allocate more resources to market B than the headquarters would, i.e., tˆA < t∗A. Given tˆA < t
∗
A, we have
that µA(tˆA) > µA(t∗A) and µB(1− tˆA) < µB(1− t∗A). Formally, in section 3.3 we show that the term H
differs depending on whether headquarters or local managers allocate resources, being higher in the
latter case. This difference in H comes from the fact that local managers ignore the inefficiency [ψ− ψ˜],
which affects directly the cost µB.
∂µB(1− t∗)
∂H
=
∂
∂H
[
µ0.5b
(
1+H
−1
1+b
)b]
< 0.
There is lower effort cost µB, when managers allocate resources. If information is cheaper in market B,
the headquarters increases sB in market B to increase the value generated by this information, which, at
the same time, favors decentralization of decisions rights in market B.
Second, the headquarters recognizes the inefficient allocation of resources of local manager, and
changes the organizational design to correct it. With this purpose, the headquarters increases sB which
also favors decentralization of decision rights in market B.
Both effects favor to decentralize market of product B. At σAB = σ˜AB the headquarters strictly prefers
to decentralize decision rights in market B. Then, it requires a higher value of σAB to centralize decisions
rights in the market of product B.
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7 Appendix B: Solving the Problem
7.1 Close Forms
In this appendix we construct the close form solutions of the expressions of ψ and ψ˜ under centralization
and decentralization that are the following:
ψc =
(3(1− s))(1+2β )2
(1+4β )(β (1−2s)+(3(1− s))(2β +1)) ,
ψd =−(1− s)5s
3(1−2β )+ s2(5β +14(β 2−1))+ s(16β +2β 2+13)− (4+6β 3+11β +12β 2)
((1− s)+2β )(1− s+β )((1− s+β )(1−2s)+3(1− s)(1− s+2β )) ,
ψ˜c = (3(1− s)) (1+2β )((1− s)+β (3−4s)
((1+4β )(β (1−2s)+(3(1− s))(2β +1)) , and
ψ˜d = (1− s) 9β
2+11β +13s2β +4−13s+14s2−5s3−12sβ (2+β )
((1− s)+2β )((1− s+β )(1−2s)+3(1− s)(1− s+2β ))) .
And its derivatives under centralization are:
∂ψc
∂ s
=
3β (2β +1)2
(1+4β )(8β (1− s)−β +3(1− s))2 ≥ 0,
∂ψ˜c
∂ s
=
3(2β +1)(3(1− s)2+β 2+2(1− s)β (10(1− s)−1)+8β 2(1− s)(4(1− s)−1))
(1+4β )2(8β (1− s)−β +3(1− s))2 < 0. (13)
And under decentralization are:
∂ψd
∂ s
=
β 2((1− s)3H1+β (1− s)2H2+β 2(1− s)H3+β 3H4+12β 4)
((1− s)+2β )2(1− s+β )2((1− s+β )(1−2s)+3(1− s)(1− s+2β ))2 ≥ 0, (14)
with H1 ≡ 160(1−s)3−120(1−s)2+27(1−s)−2, H2 ≡ 680(1−s)3−516(1−s)2+1266(1−s)+10,
H3 ≡ 956(1− s)3−744(1− s)2+204(1− s)−16 and H4 ≡ 448(1− s)3−360(1− s)2+102(1− s)−8.
∂ψ˜d
∂ s
=
5(1− s)5(5(1− s)−2)+6β (1− s)4(30(1− s)−11)+(1− s)4+6β 2(1− s)3(69(1− s)−20)
((1− s)+2β )2(5(1− s)2− (1− s)+8β (1− s)−β )2 +
6(1− s)3β +4β 3(1− s)2(104(1− s)−23)+9(1− s)2β 2+8(1− s)β 3+6β 4(32(1− s)2−8(1− s)+1)
((1− s)+2β )2(5(1− s)2− (1− s)+8β (1− s)−β )2 < 0.
7.2 Decision Making: Using Information
In this section we build the expression in equation (1) for Centralization and Decentralization before
communication outcome is introduced. To have the same terms we must replace the expression E[m2] =
[1− (1−V )]E[θ 2].
We build the indirect function for E[Π|m] given the equilibrium beliefs for m≡E[θ |m] and E[θ 2|m]≡
m2. Remember that Π1A = K(β )− (a1A−θ1A)2−β (a1A−a2A)2.
Given the optimal policy for decision making and the information transmission process, the objective
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function of each division can be expressed as a function of σ21 , σ22 , E[θ 21 |m] and E[θ 22 |m]. We show how
to arrive to the optimal expressions.
7.2.1 Centralization
The optimal decision making under centralization are:
aC1 (m1,m2) =
1+2β
1+4β
E[θ1|m1]+ 2β1+4β E[θ2|m2], and
aC2 (m1,m2) =
2β
1+4β
E[θ1|m1]+ 1+2β1+4β E[θ2|m2].
Replacing them in the expected profit of division 1 we get the following terms:
(aC1 −θ1)2 =
(
E[θ1|m1]−θ1+ 2β (E[θ2|m2]−E[θ1|m1])1+4β
)2
,
= (m1−θ1)2+ 4β
2 (m2−m1)2
(1+4β )2
+2β (m1−θ1) (m2−m1)
(1+4β )
,
=
(
m21−2m1θ1+θ 21
)
+
4β 2
(
m22+m
2
1−2m2m1
)
(1+4β )2
+2β (m1−θ1) (m2−m1)
(1+4β )
. (15)
(aC1 −aC2 )2 =
(
E[θ1|m1,m2]−E[θ2|m1,m2]
1+4β
)2
=
m21−2m1m2+m22
(1+4β )2
. (16)
Taking expectations we get that
E[(aC1 −θ1)2] =
(
E[θ 21 ]−E[m21]
)
+
4β 2
(
E[m22]+E[m
2
1]
)
(1+4β )2
, (17)
E[(aC1 −aC2 )2] =
E[m21]+E[m
2
2]
(1+4β )2
. (18)
Now, lets build the expected profits E[Π] which add both terms weighted by 1 and β respectively. Notice
that taking ex-ante expectation the following terms are null: E[m1m2] = 0, E[(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)] = 0.
Also note that E[m1θ1] = E[m21]
E[Π1] =
(
K(β )−
[
E[θ 21 ]−
1+3β
(1+4β )
E[m21]+
β
(1+4β )
E[m22]
])
. (19)
REMARK: Since E[m1] = 0 and E[θ1] = 0, then E[m21] =V E[θ 21 ] =E[θ 21 ]−(1−V )E[θ 21 ] The division
payoff is E[U1] = (1− s)Π1+ sΠ2.
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7.2.2 Decentralization
The optimal decision making under decentralization are:
aD1 (m1,m2,θ1) =
(1− s)
(1− s+β )θ1+
β
(1− s+β )
[
β
1− s+2β m1+
1− s+β
1− s+2β m2
]
, and
aD2 (m1,m2,θ2) =
(1− s)
(1− s+β )θ2+
β
(1− s+β )
[
β
1− s+2β m2+
1− s+β
1− s+2β m1
]
.
Replacing it in the expected profit of division 1 we get the following terms:
(aD1 −θ1)2 =
(
− β
(1− s+β )θ1+
β
(1− s+β )m1+
β
1− s+2β (m2−m1)
)2
,
=
β 2
(1− s+β )2 (m1−θ1)
2+
β 2
(1− s+2β )2 (m2−m1)
2+
2β 2(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)
(1− s+β )(1− s+2β ) ,
=
β 2
(
m21−2m1θ1+θ 21
)
(1− s+β )2 +
β 2
(
m22+m
2
1−2m2m1
)
(1− s+2β )2 +
2β 2(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)
(1− s+β )(1− s+2β ) . (20)
(aD1 −aD2 )2 =
(
(1− s)(θ1−θ2)
(1− s+β ) +
β
(1− s+β )
(1− s)(m2−m1)
1− s+2β
)2
,
=
(1− s)2
(1− s+β )2 (θ
2
1 +θ
2
2 −2θ1θ2)+
β 2
(1− s+β )2
(1− s)2(m22+m21−2m1m2)
(1− s+2β )2 ,
+
2β
(1− s+β )2
(1− s)2
1− s+2β (m2θ1+m1θ2−m2θ2−m1θ1). (21)
Now, lets build the expected profits E[Π] which add both terms weighted by 1 and β respectively.
Notice that taking ex-ante expectation the following terms are null: E[m1m2] = 0,E[m1θ2] = 0, E[m2θ1] =
0,E[θ1θ2] = 0, E[(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)] = 0. Also note that E[m1θ1] = E[m21] By parts27
E[(aD1 −θ1)2] =
β 2E[θ 21 ]
(1− s+β )2 +
(1− s+β )2− (1− s+2β )2
(1− s+β )2(1− s+2β )2 β
2E[m21]+
β 2
(1− s+2β )2 E[m
2
2],
=
β 2E[θ 21 ]
(1− s+β )2 −
2(1− s)+3β
(1− s+β )2(1− s+2β )2β
3E[m21]+
β 2
(1− s+2β )2 E[m
2
2].
E[(aD1 −aD2 )2] =
(1− s)2
(1− s+β )2 (E[θ
2
1 ]+E[θ
2
2 ])−
[2(1− s)+3β ]
(1− s+β )2
β (1− s)2
(1− s+2β )2 (E[m
2
2]+E[m
2
1]).
The expected profits E[Π1] are
(
K(β )−
[
β (1− s)2
(1− s+β )2 E[θ
2
2 ]+β
β +(1− s)2
(1− s+β )2 E[θ
2
1 ]−β 2
[2(1− s)+3β ]
(1− s+β )2
β +(1− s)2
(1− s+2β )2 E[m
2
1]+
(
β
β +(1− s)2
(1− s+2β )2 −
β (1− s)2
(1− s+β )2
)
E[m22]
])
. (22)
27In the profit function we have E[(aD1 −θ1)2]+βE[(aD1 −aD2 )2]. Note that (1−s+β )
2−(1−s+2β )2
(1−s+β )2(1−s+2β )2 =−β
2(1−s)+3β
(1−s+β )2(1−s+2β )2 .
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Since E[θ ] = 0, E[θ 2] =V (θ) = θ
2
3 = σ
2.
7.3 Strategic Communication: Transmission
7.3.1 Building E[m2] for any Finite Partition.
I must find the payoff for any finite partition. The general formula for a N j partition is:28
E[m2] =
1
2θ ∑j∈N j
∫ d j
d j−1
(
d j +d j−1
2
)2
dθ . (23)
By uniform distribution we get that
∫ d j
d j−1
(
d j+d j−1
2
)2
dθ = (d j−d j−1)
(
d j+d j−1
2
)2
.
From Proposition 2 we have d j,i+1 − d j,i = d j,i − d j,i−1 + 4bd j,i with b ≡ (1−2s)(1−s+β )s(1−s)+β under de-
centralization and b ≡ (1−2s)β1−s+β under centralization. Also di = θ x
i(1+yN)−yi(1+xN)
xN−yN 0 ≤ i ≤ N with x =
(1+2b)+
√
(1+2b)2−1 and y= (1+2b)−
√
(1+2b)2−1. Property xy= 1 and x > 1 applies to both
cases and are used all along the algebra. Replacing it in the expression above we have (Equation 27 in
Alonso, Dessein and Matouscheck 2008).
E[m2] =
θ 2
3
[
(x3N j −1)(x−1)2
(xN j −1)3(x2+ x+1) −
(xN j +1)2(x+1)(1+ y)
xN j(xN j − yN j)2
]
,
=
θ 2
3
[
(x3N j −1)(x−1)2
(xN j −1)3(x2+ x+1) −
xN j(x+1)2
x(xN j −1)2
]
. (24)
For the case with infinite partitions we have
lim
N j→+∞
E[m2] =
θ 2
4
(x+1)2
(x2+ x+1)
= θ 2
1+b
3+4b
=Vσ2 = [1− (1−V )]σ2. (25)
If the sender is truly believed, he will report exaggerating the signal. For example, if s= 0, a manager
has incentives to misreport θR− θ = β1+β θ under centralization and θR− θ = 1+ββ θ under decentral-
ization. For this case, his report is: θR ≡ (1+4β )(1+2β )
(1+2β )2+β θ =
1+2β
1+β θ under centralization and θ
R ≡ 1+2ββ θ
under decentralization.
7.4 Imperfect Signals
Given the information acquired, specified by the effort e, each manager have a posterior about the true
value. That is, given the realization of the signal θˆ (that coincide with the true value of θ with probability√
e), the manager’s posterior is θ˜ = E[θ |θˆ ] =√eθˆ .29 This posterior is the best guess that a manager has
28Note that m2 =
(
d j+d j−1
2
)2
is the expected value given a particular signal. Then, E[m2] is the ex-ante expected value in the
expression.
29Note that we care about the mean of the posterior and not the posterior distribution. The posterior mean distribution is
uniform in [−√eθ ,√eθ ].
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over the true value θ , and he prefers to design a product that is closest to this estimation of consumers’
tastes.
With the posterior, the headquarters has also inferences after she receives managers’ reports that are
E[θ˜ 21 |m] and E[θ˜ 22 |m] The optimal decision making under centralization are:
aC1 (m1,m2) =
1+2β
1+4β
E[θ˜1|m1]+ 2β1+4β E[θ˜2|m2], and
aC2 (m1,m2) =
2β
1+4β
E[θ˜1|m1]+ 1+2β1+4β E[θ˜2|m2].
Then, replacing it in the expected profit of manager in country 1 we get the following terms:
(aC1 −θ1)2 =
(
E[θ˜1|m1]−θ1+
2β
(
E[θ˜2|m2]−E[θ˜1|m1]
)
1+4β
)2
,
= (m1−θ1)2+ 4β
2 (m2−m1)2
(1+4β )2
+2β (m1−θ1) (m2−m1)
(1+4β )
,
= (m1−θ1)2+
4β 2
(
m22+m
2
1−2m2m1
)
(1+4β )2
+2β (m1−θ1) (m2−m1)
(1+4β )
. (26)
(aC1 −aC2 )2 =
(
E[θ˜1|m1,m2]−E[θ˜2|m1,m2]
1+4β
)2
=
m21−2m1m2+m22
(1+4β )2
. (27)
Notice that taking ex-ante expectation the following terms are null E[m1m2] = 0, E[(m1−θ1)(m2−m1)]=
0. Also note that E[m1θ1] = E[m21]. Also, note that m2 = E[θ˜1]2 = e1θˆ 21 and then E[m21] = e1E[θˆ 21 ] =
e1V1
θ 21
3 . Taking expectations
E[(aC1 −θ1)2] = E[(m1−θ1)2]+
4β 2
(
E[m22]+E[m
2
1]
)
(1+4β )2
, (28)
E[(aC1 −aC2 )2] =
E[m21]+E[m
2
2]
(1+4β )2
. (29)
Building the expected profits E[Π] which add both terms weighted by 1 and β respectively.
E[Π1] =
(
K(β )−E[(m1−θ1)2]+ β
(1+4β )
(E[m21]+E[m
2
2])
)
. (30)
where the term E[(m1−θ1)2] is the difference between the real realization of θ and what the HQ believes
of θ˜ after receiving the report. Note that the message of the posterior is equivalent as a message of the
signal, then m =
√
eE[θˆ |m].
E[(m−θ)2] = E[(m−√eθˆ +√eθˆ −θ)2],
= E[
(√
eE[θˆ |m]−√eθˆ)2]+E[(√eθˆ −θ)2].
with the first term being the communication accuracy of the signal, i.e.,E[
(√
eE[θˆ |m]−√eθˆ)2] = eV E[θ 2].
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The second term is the loss due to the lack of precision in the signal, i.e., E[
(√
eθˆ −θ)2] = (1−
e)E[θ 2].30 Recall that V is the proportion of the variance communicated, i.e., how accurate the com-
munication is. We prove now that the omitted term is equal to zero, i.e., E[
(
m−√eθˆ)(√eθˆ −θ)] = 0.
Proof.
E[
(
m−√eθˆ)(√eθˆ −θ)] = E[m(√eθˆ −θ)]−E[√eθˆ (√eθˆ −θ)],
= E[m
(√
eθˆ −θ)]−E[√eθˆ (√eθˆ −θ)].
The first term is not problematic E[m
(√
eθˆ −θ)] = 0, but the second term deserves a little more of
attention to notice that E[
√
eθˆ
(√
eθˆ −θ)] = E[eθˆ 2]−E[√eθˆθ ] = 0. I prove that E[eθˆ 2] = eE[θ 2] =
E[
√
eθˆθ ]:
E[
√
eθˆθ ] = E[
√
e
√
eθθ +(1−√e)√exθ ] = E[eθ 2+(1−√e)√exθ ] =,
eE[θ 2]+ (1−√e)√e E[xθ ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 independent
= eE[θ 2]. (31)
Now, we show the other part.
E[eθˆ 2] = E[
√
eeθ 2+(1−√e)ex2] =√eeE[θ 2]+ (1−√e)eE[x2] = eE[θ 2]. (32)
The proof is complete.
REMARK: Since E[m1] = 0 and E[θ1] = 0, then E[m21] = e1E[θˆ 21 ] = e1V1
θ 21
3
E[Π1] =
(
K(β )− θ
2
3
[
1−
(
1−V1 1+3β
(1+4β )
)
e1+ e2V2
β
(1+4β )
])
.
And the division payoff is E[U1] = (1− s)Π1+ sΠ2. Adding up for both divisions
E[Π1]+E[Π2] =
(
2K(β )− θ
2
3
[
1−
(
1−V1 1+2β
(1+4β )
)
e1−
(
1−V2 1+2β
(1+4β )
)
e2
])
,
=
(
2K(β )− θ
2
3
[1− e1ψ1− e2ψ2]
)
.
A similarly analysis accounts for the case under decentralization. For further details you can see
Proposition 5 in Rantakari (2010).
30E[
(√
eθˆ −θ)2] = E[eθˆ2] + E[θ2]− 2E[√eθˆθ ] = (1− e)E[θ2], which equation (31) proves that E[eθˆ2] = eE[θ2] and
E[
√
eθˆθ ] = eE[θ2].
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7.5 Indirect Profit Function before Communication and Decisions
Value created and value captured:
ψ1(s) = 1−φ11(s)−φ12(s),
ψ˜11(s) = (1− s)(1−φ11(s))− sφ12(s),
ψ˜11(s) = (1− s)ψ1(s)+(1−2s)φ12(s).
It is worth noting that from communication and decision making both φ11(s) and φ12(s) are decreasing in
s. Under centralization the reason is that communication is becoming more precise. Under decentraliza-
tion both decisions are less biased and communication is more precise. The externality φ12(s) is almost
always greater under decentralization.31 This externality reflects the high responsiveness to local condi-
tions (to increase revenues) which also reduces the coordination what is translated into higher production
costs.
The expected profits for a particular product in division 1 are,
E[Π1] = K(β )−
1− e1 [1−Λ1−Γ11(1−V1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to 1 information
+e2 [Λ1+Γ21(1−V2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
due to 2 information
+µC(e1)
σ2θ . (33)
Expected value generated by division 1:
E[pi1A]+E[pi1B] = KA−σ2A + e1Aψ1Aσ2A−µA(t1A)C(e1A)σ2A,
+ KB−σ2B + e1Bψ1Bσ2B−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B)σ2B.
Expected value appropriated by local manager in division 1:
K−σ2A + e1Aψ˜11Aσ2A + e2Aψ˜21Aσ2A−µA(t1A)C(e1A)σ2A,
K−σ2B + e1Bψ˜11Bσ2B + e2Bψ˜21Bσ2B−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B)σ2B.
7.6 Headquarters Allocates Resources
7.6.1 Assumption
Sufficient Assumption for ΠtAtA ≤ 0 (and when managers allocate t) is:
A1- µ(t)µ ′′(t)C(e)C′′(e)>C′(e)2µ ′(t)2 for all t and e.
This assumption holds for functions µ(t) = µ
(0.5
t
)b
with b ∈ [0,1] and µ ∈ R+, and C(e) = −(e+
log(1− e)).
31Only if s→ 0 and β →+∞ the externality is a little greater under centralization.
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7.6.2 Managers’ Choices
Each manager solves:
max
e1A,e1B
2K−σ2A−σ2B +(e1Aψ˜11A+ e2Aψ˜21A−µA(t1A)C(e1A))σ2A,
+(e1Bψ˜11B+ e2Bψ˜21B−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B))σ2B.
The values of eA and eB are determined by ψ˜σ2− µ(t)C′(e)σ2 = 0. The comparative static are: i-
∂e
∂ s =
∂ψ˜
∂ s
1
µC′′(e) < 0; ii-
∂e
∂ t =− µ
′(t)C′(e)
µ(t)C′′(e) > 0;
∂e
∂σ2 = 0; and
∂eA
∂ sB = 0. Also
∂ 2e
∂ s∂ t
=−∂ψ˜
∂ s
1
[µC′′(e)]2
µ ′(t)
C′′(e)
[C′′(e)2−C′(e)C′′′(e)]> 0 if e > 0.5,
∂ 2e
∂ t2
=−
C′(e)C′′(e)[µ(t)µ ′′(t)−µ ′(t)2]−µ ′(t)2 C′(e)C′′(e) [C′′(e)2−C′′′(e)C′(e)]
[µC′′(e)]2
< 0,
∂ 2e
∂ s2
=
[
∂ 2ψ˜
∂ s2
−
(
∂ψ˜
∂ s
)2 C′′′(e)
µC′′(e)2
]
1
µC′′(e)
≷ 0.
Where ∂
2e
∂ s2 ≤ 0 for µ sufficiently small. We can define tB = 1− tA and we have ∂eB∂ tA =
µ ′(1−tA)C′(eB)
µ(1−tA)C′′(eB) < 0.
7.6.3 Headquarters’ Design
The HQ solves:
max
sA,sB,tA
E[pi1A]+E[pi1B] = K−σ2A +(e1Aψ1A−µA(t1A)C(e1A))σ2A,
+K−σ2B +(e1Bψ1B−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B))σ2B. (34)
The first order conditions are,
σ2A
[
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A)
]
= 0,
σ2B
[
∂ψB
∂ sB
eB+
∂eB
∂ sB
(ψB− ψ˜B)
]
= 0,
−µ ′(tA)C(eA)σ2A +
∂eA
∂ tA
(ψA− ψ˜A)σ2A +µ ′(1− tA)C(eB)σ2B +
∂eB
∂ tA
(ψB− ψ˜B)σ2B = 0.
The second order conditions are
ΠsAsA 0
∂ψA
∂ sA
∂eA
∂ tA
+ ∂
2eA
∂ sA∂ tA
(ψA− ψ˜A)
0 ΠsBsB
∂ψB
∂ sB
∂eB
∂ tA
+ ∂
2eB
∂ sB∂ tA
(ψB− ψ˜B)
σ2A [
∂ψA
∂ sA
∂eA
∂ tA
+ ∂
2eA
∂ sA∂ tA
(ψA− ψ˜A)] σ2B [ ∂ψB∂ sB
∂eB
∂ tA
+ ∂
2eB
∂ sB∂ tA
(ψB− ψ˜B)] ΠtAtA

 dsAdsB
dtA
 .
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WhereΠtAtA ≡σ2A
[
−µ ′′ACA−µ ′AC1A ∂eA∂ tA +
∂ 2eA
∂ t2A
(ψA−ψ˜A)
]
+σ2B
[
−µ ′′BCB+µ ′BC1B ∂eB∂ tA +
∂ 2eB
∂ t2A
(ψB−ψ˜B)
]
.32
We can split ΠtAtA into two parts ΠtAtA ≡ΠAtAtA +ΠBtAtA . Also ΠsAsA ≡ ∂
2ψA
∂ s2A
eA+
∂ψA
∂ sA
∂eA
∂ sA +
∂ 2eA
∂ s2A
(ψA− ψ˜A)+
∂eA
∂ sA
∂ (ψA−ψ˜A)
∂ sA (≤ 0 in our relevant domain). The determinant is defined by |J| ≡ΠsAsA [ΠsBsBΠtAtA−Π2sBtB ]−
ΠsBsBΠ2sAtA or
|J| ≡ΠsAsA [ΠsBsBΠBtAtA−Π2sBtB ]+ΠsBsB [ΠsAsAΠAtAtA−Π2sAtA ]< 0 00
µ ′A(tA)C(eA)− ∂eA∂ tA (ψA− ψ˜A)
(dσ2A)=
 00
−ΠtAσ2A
(dσ2A) .
Then, we have ΠsAsA ≤ 0, ΠsBsB ≤ 0, ΠtAtA ≤ 0 but ΠsAtA ≥ 0, −ΠtAσ2A ≤ 0 and ΠsBtA ≤ 0. I took
common factor σ2Aσ2B, then:
∂ sA
∂σ2A
=
−ΠtAσ2A [−ΠsAtAΠsBsB ]
|J| > 0, (35)
∂ tA
∂σ2A
=
−ΠtAσ2A [ΠsAsAΠsBsB ]
|J| > 0, (36)
∂ sB
∂σ2A
=−
−ΠtAσ2A [ΠsBtAΠsAsA ]
|J| < 0. (37)
Finally, the headquarters chooses to centralize or decentralize decision rights in each market considering
the one that generates higher value, i.e., higher [ψAeA− µAC(eA)]σ2A + [ψBeB− µBC(eB)]σ2B. If µ is
sufficiently low and σ2A ∼ σ2B, the headquarters decentralizes decision rights about both products. If σ2A
increases, sA and tA increase and sB decreases, making more likely that the firm prefers to centralize
decision rights of product B (see equations (35), (36), and (37)). There is a cutoff σ˜2A above which
the headquarters decentralizes decision making about product A and centralizes decision making about
product B.
7.7 Managers Allocate Resources
7.7.1 Managers’ Choices
Each manager solves:
max
e1A,e1B,t1A
2K−σ2A−σ2B +(e1Aψ˜11A+ e2Aψ˜21A−µA(t1A)C(e1A))σ2A,
+(e1Bψ˜11B+ e2Bψ˜21B−µB(1− t1A)C(eiB))σ2B.
32Note that, replacing the expression of ∂eA∂ tA , each term in brackets can be re-expressed as
[
− 1µACA11 (µAµ ′′ACACA11 −
µ ′2A C
2
1A)+
∂ 2eA
∂ t2A
(ψA− ψ˜A)
]
< 0 guaranteeing that ΠtAtA ≤ 0.
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The first order conditions are
ψ˜Aσ2A−µA(tA)C′Aσ2A = 0,
ψ˜Bσ2B−µB(1− tA)C′Bσ2B = 0,
−µ ′A(tA)C(eA)σ2A +µ ′B(1− tA)C(eB)σ2B = 0.
Differentiating the first order conditions we have, −µA(tA)C′′Aσ2A 0 −µ ′A(tA)C′Aσ2A0 −µB(1− tA)C′′Bσ2B µ ′B(1− tA)C′Bσ2B
−µ ′A(tA)C′Aσ2A µ ′B(1− tA)C1(eB)σ2B −(µ ′′A(tA)C(eA)σ2A +µ ′′B(1− tA)C(eB)σ2B)

 deAdeB
dtA
 .
 0 −
∂ψ˜A
∂ sA σ
2
A 0 0
0 0 0 − ∂ψ˜B∂ sB σ2B
µ ′A(tA)C(eA) 0 µ ′B(tB)C(eB) 0


dσ2A
dsA
dσ2B
dsB
 .
where
|J|=−µA(tA)C′′Aσ2A
[
µB(1− tA)C′′Bσ2B
(
µ ′′A(tA)C(eA)σ
2
A +µ
′′
B(1− tA)C(eB)σ2B
)
− [µ ′B(1− tA)C′Bσ2B]2
]
+µ ′A(tA)C
′
Aσ
2
A
[
µ ′A(tA)C
′
Aσ
2
AµB(1− tA)C′′Bσ2B
]
Assumption A1, i.e., µ(t)µ ′′(t)C(e)C′′(e) > C′(e)2µ ′(t)2 for all t and e, is a sufficient condition for
|J|< 0. The comparatives static respect to sA are
∂eA
∂ sA
=
∂ψ˜A
∂ sA
σ2B
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′Bµ ′′AC(eA)σ2A
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
< 0.
∂eB
∂ sA
=−∂ψ˜A
∂ sA
µ ′A(tA)C′Aµ ′B(1− tA)C′Bσ2A
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
> 0.
∂ tA
∂ sA
=−∂ψ˜A
∂ sA
µ ′A(tA)C′AµB(1− tA)C′′Bσ2A
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
< 0.
The comparatives static respect to σ2A are
∂eA
∂σ2A
=
µ ′A(tA)2C(eA)C′AµB(1− tA)C′′B
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
> 0.
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∂eB
∂σ2A
=− µ
′
A(tA)C(eA)µA(tA)C′′Aµ ′B(1− tA)C1(eB)
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
< 0.
∂ tA
∂σ2A
=− µ
′
A(tA)C(eA)µA(tA)C′′AµB(1− tA)C′′B
σ2BµAC′′A
[
µBC′′Bµ ′′BC(eB)− [µ ′BC′B]2
]
+µBC′′B
[
µ ′′AC(eA)µAC′′A− (µ ′AC′A)2
]
σ2A
> 0.
7.7.2 Headquarters’ Design
the HQ’s problem is maxsA,sB E[pi1A]+E[pi1B]
max
sA,sB
K−σ2A +(e1Aψ1A−µA(t1A)C(e1A))σ2A +K−σ2B +(e1BψB−µB(1− t1A)C(e1B))σ2B. (38)
the first order conditions are
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A)+ σ
2
B
σ2A
∂eB
∂ sA
(ψB− ψ˜B) = 0,
∂ψB
∂ sB
eB+
∂eB
∂ sB
(ψB− ψ˜B)+ σ
2
A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ sB
(ψA− ψ˜A) = 0.
Notice that these first order conditions capture the effects of sA on ψA and on eA like when the head-
quarters allocate resources. However, it also captures the indirect effects of sA on eA and eB through a
change in tA. This indirect effects are of second order magnitude and do not modify the main trade-off
when choosing the organizational design.
The headquarters chooses to centralize or decentralize decision rights considering the sum of [ψAeA−
µAC(eA)]σ2A +[ψBeB−µBC(eB)]σ2B. If µ is sufficiently low and σ2A ∼ σ2B, the headquarters decentralizes
decision rights about both products. Since both products are similar in terms of returns to differentiation
the headquarters follows a strategy of product differentiation in both products. If σ2A increases, sA and tA
increase and sB decreases, making more likely that the firm prefers to centralize decision rights of product
B. There is a cutoff σˆ2A above which the headquarters decentralizes decision making about product A and
centralizes decision making about product B.
Note that the change in the organizational design that yields decentralization in product A and cen-
tralization in product B has an discrete jump in the optimal shares. The jump in s arises because the
headquarters centralizes product B which non-locally reduces sB; this also modifies ψB− ψ˜B and, conse-
quently, provides incentives to reduce sA and to increase sB.
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7.7.3 Redefining Effects
Given an efficient allocation of resources, t∗A, the optimal s is defined by σ2A[
∂ψA
∂ sA eA+
∂eA
∂ sA (ψA− ψ˜A)] = 0.
However, if local managers allocate resources the first order condition becomes:
σ2A[
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A)]+ ∂ tA∂ sA
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψAσ2A− ψ˜Aσ2A]+
∂ tA
∂ sA
∂eB
∂ tA
[ψBσ2B− ψ˜Bσ2B],
+
∂ tA
∂ sA
[−µ ′A(tA)CA(eA)σ2A +µ ′B(1− tA)CB(eB)σ2B] = 0.
with ∂ tA∂ sA < 0 and
∂ tA
∂ sB > 0 leading to
∂ψA
∂ sA
eA+
∂eA
∂ sA
(ψA− ψ˜A) = − ∂ tA∂ sA
σ2B
σ2A
[σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψA− ψ˜A]+ ∂eB∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]
]
,
∂ψB
∂ sB
eB+
∂eB
∂ sB
(ψB− ψ˜B) = − ∂ tA∂ sB
[σ2A
σ2B
∂eA
∂ tA
[ψA− ψ˜A]+ ∂eB∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]
]
.
calling ϕ ≡ σ2Aσ2B
∂eA
∂ tA [ψA− ψ˜A] +
∂eB
∂ tA [ψB− ψ˜B]. It is easier to separate the indirect effect of sA and sB on
tA from the direct effect of sA on eA and sB on eB. This alternative expression is used in the following
section.
8 Appendix C: Extension
8.1 Extension in Section 4.1: Coordination
The first order conditions of the Headquarters problem are
−∂µA
∂ tA
σ2A
[
C(eA)− ∂eA∂µA [ψA−µAC
′(eA)]
]
=−∂µB
∂ tB
σ2B
[
C(eB)− ∂eB∂µB [ψB−µBC
′(eB)]
]
, (39)
σ2A
[
eA
∂ψA
∂ sA
+
∂eA
∂ sA
[ψA−µAC′(eA)]
]
= 0, (40)
σ2B
[
eB
∂ψB
∂ sB
+
∂eB
∂ sB
[ψB−µBC′(eB)]
]
= 0. (41)
K′(βA)−σ2A
[
eA
∂ψA
∂βA
+
∂eA
∂βA
[ψA−µAC′(eA)
]
= 0, (42)
K′(βB)−σ2B
[
eB
∂ψB
∂βB
+
∂eB
∂βB
[ψB−µBC′(eB)
]
= 0. (43)
First, we could replace the optimal effort choice µAC′(eA) = ψ˜ into all first order conditions. Once tA
is chosen, the decisions of (s,β ,g) are described by Rantakari (2010). Given the convexity of µ(t), the
decision of tA depends directly on who makes effort choice. In either case there exists increasing relations
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σ˜2B(σ2A) and σ˜2A(σ2B) such that product A is centralized if σ2A < σ˜2A(σ2B) and decentralized if σ2A ≥ σ˜2A(σ2B),
and product B is centralized if σ2B < σ˜2B(σ2A) and decentralized if σ2B ≥ σ˜2B(σ2A).
If local division managers control resources, the first order conditions are
σ2A
[
eA
∂ψA
∂ sA
+
∂eA
∂ sA
[ψA−µAC′(eA)]
]
= − ∂ tA
∂ sA
ϕ, (44)
σ2B
[
eB
∂ψB
∂ sB
+
∂eB
∂ sB
[ψB−µBC′(eB)]
]
= − ∂ tA
∂ sB
ϕ. (45)
K′(βA)−σ2A
[
eA
∂ψA
∂βA
+
∂eA
∂βA
[ψA−µAC′(eA)
]
= − ∂ tA
∂βA
ϕ, (46)
K′(βB)−σ2B
[
eB
∂ψB
∂βB
+
∂eB
∂βB
[ψB−µBC′(eB)
]
= − ∂ tA
∂βB
ϕ, (47)
with
ϕ ≡ σ2A
∂µA
∂ tA
∂eA
∂µA
[
ψA−µAC′(eA)
]−σ2B ∂µB∂ tB ∂eB∂µB [ψB−µBC′(eB)] . (48)
We can replace the optimal allocation of time chosen by managers into ϕ . There exists increasing rela-
tions σ˜2BM(σ2A) and σ˜2AM(σ2B) such that decision making about product A is centralized if σ2A < σ˜2AM(σ2B)
and decentralized if σ2A ≥ σ˜2AM(σ2B), and decision making about product B is centralized if σ2B < σ˜2BM(σ2A)
and decentralized if σ2B ≥ σ˜2BM(σ2A).
When σ2A > σ2B then ϕ > 0, and thus the firm prefers to allocate more resources in product A than
implemented by local managers, i.e., tA < t∗A. The right hand side of equations (44) and (46) are positive
and the right hand side of equations (45) and (47) are negative. The headquarters aligns incentive, s,
and integrate divisions, β , to affect the resource allocation choice of local managers. When σ2A > σ2B,
the headquarters reduces incentive alignment of product A, i.e., ∇sA, increases incentive alignment of
product B, i.e., ∆sB, reduces integration of product A, i.e ∇βA, and increases integration of product B, i.e.,
∆βB. In other words, local managers put too much resources in product B, because they underestimate the
opportunity cost of resources. The headquarters finds less important to provide incentives for information
acquisition in product B and then decentralization appears more profitable.
8.2 Extension in Section 4.2: Delegation
The headquarters objective function is:
E[piiA]+E[piiB] =
{
KA− [1− (eA+αeB)ψA+µAC(eiA)]σ2A
}
+
{
KB− [1− (eB+αeA)ψB+µBC(eiB)]σ2B
}
.
When the headquarters control resources, the first order conditions are
−∂µA
∂ tA
σ2A
[
C(eA)− ∂eA∂µA [ψA +
σ2B
σ2A
αψB−µAC′(eA)]
]
=−∂µB
∂ tB
σ2B
[
C(eB)− ∂eB∂µB [ψB +
σ2A
σ2B
αψA−µBC′(eB)]
]
. (49)
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σ2A
[
(eA+αeB)
∂ψA
∂ sA
+
∂eA
∂ sA
[ψA+
σ2B
σ2A
αψB−µAC′(eA)]
]
= 0, (50)
σ2B
[
(eB+αeA)
∂ψB
∂ sB
+
∂eB
∂ sB
[ψB+
σ2A
σ2B
αψA−µBC′(eB)]
]
= 0. (51)
Once tA is chosen, the effort exerted by local managers is given by ψ˜A = µAC′(eˆA). Note that the ineffi-
ciency in effort choice is given by ψA− ψ˜A+ σ
2
B
σ2A
αψB.
If local division managers control resources, the first order conditions are
σ2A
[
(eA+αeB)
∂ψA
∂ sA
+
∂eA
∂ sA
[ψA+
σ2B
σ2A
αψB−µAC′(eA)]
]
= − ∂ tA
∂ sA
ϕ, (52)
σ2B
[
(eB+αeA)
∂ψB
∂ sB
+
∂eB
∂ sB
[ψB+
σ2A
σ2B
αψA−µBC′(eB)]
]
= − ∂ tA
∂ sB
ϕ. (53)
with
ϕ ≡ σ2A
∂µA
∂ tA
∂eA
∂µA
[
ψA+
σ2B
σ2A
αψB−µAC′(eA)
]
−σ2B
∂µB
∂ tB
∂eB
∂µB
[
ψB+
σ2A
σ2B
αψA−µBC′(eB)
]
. (54)
However, the effort choice is now given by ψ˜A+
σ2B
σ2A
αψ˜B = µAC′(eˆA), and the inefficiency in effort choice
is given by ψA− ψ˜A + σ
2
B
σ2A
α(ψB− ψ˜B). The headquarters faces a trade-off between allocating resources
efficiently and internalizing the learning externality. If the firm is organized by regional divisions and
resource allocation is delegated to local managers, there is an inefficiency in resource allocation but local
managers internalize that learning about one product has a positive externality in learning about the other
product.
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